The effect of social capital on group loan repayment: evidence from field experiments*

By Alessandra Cassar, Lucas Crowley, B. Wydick. 2007

313 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Education, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c6d7e5a383b361d3dcdfce0245cd4f69b59e7ed6

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Susanna Khavul
2. G. Fischer
3. Matthieu Chemin
4. Alexander Newman
5. Susan Schwarz
6. Dan Borgia
7. Dean S. Karlan
8. Abhijit Banerjee

In Education

1. G. Fischer
2. Dean S. Karlan
3. Alexander Newman
4. Susanna Khavul

In Safety Research

1. G. Fischer
2. Susan Schwarz
3. Dean S. Karlan
4. Matthieu Chemin
5. Dan Borgia
6. Alexander Newman
7. Susanna Khavul
8. Abhijit Banerjee

Citations in the corpus

• Capital is not enough: opportunity entrepreneurship and formal institutions (2018, unknown): “At the macro-level, social capital is associated with higher levels of trust and reciprocity (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1995), which can facilitate market transactions such as loan repayments (Cassar et al. 2007; Cassar and Wydick 2010).”
• How does microfinance enhance entrepreneurial outcomes in emerging economies? The mediating mechanisms of psychological and social capital (2014, background): “The extent to which microfinance supports poverty alleviation in emerging market economies has been the focus of a growing body of research in the field of development economics (Cassar et al., 2007; Feigenburg et al., 2010; Gine and Karlan, 2008; Karlan, 2007; Zeller, 1998).”
• Group Membership, Relationship Banking and Loan Default Risk: The Case of Online Social Lending (2015, unknown): “Cassar, Crowley and Wydick (2007), however, performed a series of experimental microlending games in South Africa and Armenia and found that mere social contact was not enough, but that reduction of default risk occurred only when those relationships included personal trust.”
• The Benefits and Costs of Microfinance: Evidence from Bangladesh (2008, background): “( 2007 ) and Karlan ( 2007 ) who try to uncover the fundamental determinants of repayment.”
• Microfinance: Creating Opportunities for the Poor? (2010, background): “In a related study, Cassar, Crowley, and Wydick (2007) used field experiments in multiple countries to show that social cohesion and group homogeneity promote loan repayment more than the levels of trust in the society as a whole.”
• Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups (2014, unknown): “Work along these lines includes Abbink et al (2006), Cassar et al (2007), Fischer (2013), and Giné et al. (2010).”
• Social Connections and Group Banking (2007, background): “Laboratory experiments in the field provide an alternative approach for examining this question (Cassar et al., 2007; Gine et al., 2006).”
• THE EMPIRICS OF MICROFINANCE: WHAT DO WE KNOW? (2007, unknown): “ Cassar et al. (2007) also focus on the importance of social ties (the authors use the term social capital) in explaining repayment performance of groups.”
• Contract Structure, Risk Sharing and Investment Choice (2011, methodology): “29The three GSS questions are the same as those used by Giné, Jakiela, Karlan, and Morduch (2009) and Cassar, Crowley, and Wydick (2007).”