Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect

By Maitreesh Ghatak. 2000

474 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/706ef6b1e3ca6e454e8da420668984fa3bf4a0c6

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Citations in the corpus

Inequality And Group Participation: Theory And Evidence From Rural Tanzania (2002, unknown): “In this case, (12) holds unambiguously because the right-hand side is less than unity by construction.”
THE EMPIRICS OF MICROFINANCE: WHAT DO WE KNOW? (2007, unknown): “Ghatak (1999; 2000) and Gangopadhyay et al. (2005), among others, provide models focusing on adverse selection and screening.”
Can Micro-Credit Bring Development? (2008, background): “Thus r = ρ, and collateral C ≥ w∗ ≡ KS−qF/ρ is required from any agent seeking to become selfemployed and C ≥ w∗∗ ≡ K − qF/ρ from any agent seeking to become an entrepreneur.(13) We assume the credit market imperfection is severe enough (qF small enough) so that w∗ > 0.”
Loan Repayment Performance in Community Development Finance Institutions in the UK (2005, background): “According to Ghatak (2000), less risky borrowers are more”
Social Connections and Group Banking (2007, background): “to group lending, that peers select their own group members (see Ghatak, 1999; Ghatak, 2000).”
Microfinance: Where do we Stand? (2004, background): “Maitreesh Ghatak (2000), and Beatriz Armendáriz de Aghion and Christian Gollier (2000), for example, argue that allowing borrowers to voluntarily form their own groups helps microlenders overcome an “adverse selection” problem.”
Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups (2009, unknown): “repayment: (i) adverse selection: ascertaining the riskiness of borrowers ( Ghatak (1999; 2000) ,”
Financially Interlinked Business Groups (2001, unknown): “In particular, joint liability can be used as an instrument to sort borrowers according to the riskiness of their projects (see, for example, Ghatak, 2000).”
The wisdom of the crowd in funding: information heterogeneity and social networks of crowdfunders (2018, background): “Also, the commitment of funders to a project of someone with whom they have ties, makes use of local information in the funding process in a similar way that endogenous peer selection takes place in group lending in microfinance (Ghatak 2000).”
On mission drift in microfinance institutions (2011, unknown): “December 24, 2010 12:29 9.75in x 6.5in b980-ch15 Handbook of Microfinance FA 352 Beatriz Armendáriz and Ariane Szafarz (1999), Conning (1999), Ghatak (1999), Ghatak (2000), Armendáriz and Gollier (2000), Jain and Mansuri (2003), and Tedeschi (2006), Labie et al. (2010), and many others.”
Microfinance Impact Assessments: The Perils of Using New Members as a Control Group (2001, background): “Theory suggests (Ghatak 2000) and evidence supports(2) (Hatch 1997) that individuals are selected into banks in just this way, assortatively by quality of participants, where wealth is used by peers as a proxy for quality.”
Group Versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines (2006, unknown): “repayment: (i) adverse selection: ascertaining the riskiness of borrowers ( Ghatak (1999; 2000) ,”