Contract Structure, Risk Sharing and Investment Choice

By G. Fischer. 2011

152 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Soil Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/613396871adab8a8a47673e4ecafb95b9a11e3d8

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Economics and Econometrics

In Soil Science

Citations in the corpus

Microcredit Under the Microscope: What Have We Learned in the Past Two Decades, and What Do We Need to Know? (2013, background): “Fischer (2011) carries out a similar exercise in India with potential and actual microcredit borrowers.”
Systematic Review. What is the evidence of the impact of microfinance on the well-being of poor people? (2011, background): “Fisher (1935), Neyman (1923) and Cox (1958) were early proponents of randomised experiments.”
Factorial Designs, Model Selection, and (Incorrect) Inference in Randomized Experiments (2019, unknown): “Subsidiary factors may be brought into an experiment so as to test the principal factors under a variety of conditions similar to those that will be encountered in the population to which recommendations are to apply”; see also the discussion in Fisher (1992). Thus, factorial designs and the short m”
Underinvestment in a Profitable Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh (2014, background): “Aversion to experimentation can also hinder entrepreneurship and business start-ups and growth (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003; Fischer 2013).”
Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups (2014, unknown): “The adverse selection story of Ghatak (1999; 2000) is consistent with results from baseline clients in the first trial but not consistent with the lack of default among members that joined after the conversion nor the results from the second trial.”
Remembering to Pay? Reminders vs. Financial Incentives for Loan Payments (2011, unknown): “Several papers have also shown the impact of the cost of capital or the structure of the loan on the take up of credit and the ex ante selection effects on borrower types, e.g. Karlan and Zinman (2011) or Fischer (2010).”
Access to Finance (2010, unknown): “The structure of group-liability contracts produces an ambiguous effect on risk-taking in entrepreneurial investments, and thus on returns (Fischer, 2008).”
Group lending or individual lending? Evidence from a randomised field experiment in Mongolia (2011, unknown): “Fischer (2010) undertakes similar laboratory-style experiments and also finds that under limited information, group liability stimulates risk-taking as borrowers free-ride on the insurance provided by co-borrowers (see also Wydick, 1999).”
Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups (2009, unknown): “One could argue that the results from the first experiment lend support to the adverse selection story of Ghatak (2000) because borrowers that selected into the program under joint liability would tend to be safer.”