1 Bidding in Common-Value Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research

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A Comparison of Buyer-Determined and Price-Based Multiattribute Mechanisms (2007, methodology): “We refer the interested reader to Kagel (1995) for a review.”
Preference Elicitation under Oath (2010, positive): “Past experimental evidence has shown that the second-price auction with monetary incentives only leads to mixed performance at the individual level – as bidders overbid or underbid relative to their induced value (see Kagel, 1995).”
The psychometric and empirical properties of measures of risk preferences (2017, neutral): “For example, risk aversion is often a confound when testing auction theory, and researchers often include a measure of risk aversion similar to the ones considered here as a control variable when testing the theory (see the review in Kagel and Levin, 1995).”
The "I Designed It Myself" Effect in Mass Customization (2010, background): “This procedure ensures theoretical incentive compatibility: prices are exogenous to the subjects’ WTP (unlike in other methods such as English auctions, bidders cannot directly inﬂuence the price paid; Kagel 1995, Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002).”
Definition, Measurement and Determinants of the Consumer's Willingness to Pay: A Critical Synthesis and Avenues for Further Research (2009, background): “Theoretically, a rational bidder is encouraged to reveal his real WTP, thus limiting the occurrence of strategic bias (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Kagel, 1995; Shogren et al 2001).”