The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction?

By Shaun Gallagher. 2001

296 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/64fa57d610f730dd6456e7eab5f90dd572eda247

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

Participatory sense-making (2007, background): “Although several researchers have already started to regard problems in social cognition from embodied perspectives (Gallagher 2001; 2005; In press; Hutto 2004; Klin, Jones, Schultz, et al. 2003; Thompson 2001), one motivation for our proposal is the observation that they have not yet gone far enoug”
The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: a Critique (2011, background): “As Gallagher (2001, 2004) sees it, primary intersubjectivity in the narrow developmental sense in turn encompasses both what Baron-Cohen (1995) called ID (for intentionality detector) and EDD (for eye-direction detector).”
Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation (2009, background): “Instead, we just immediately perceive the other's intentions and emotions in his expressive behaviour as related to a meaningful context (Scheler 1954; Gallagher 2001, 2008; Merleau-Ponty 1962, pp 215ff).”
Two problems of intersubjectivity (2009, background): “Among several alternatives to TT and ST, I have argued for what I call interaction theory (IT) (Gallagher, 2001; 2004; 2008a; 2008b; prior experience) can enhance the mirror resonance process is often cited by simulation theorists as evidence that mirror resonance is indeed a simulation process.”
Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2003, background): “Can phenomenologists, who have themselves struggled with the assignment of primacy to mentalistic frameworks, offer any insights that might be useful in this context? We think there is good phenomenological evidence to the effect that, in the majority of intersubjective situations, the human subject”
The phenomenology and development of social perspectives (2013, background): “…focuses on the expressive bodily behaviour, inter-bodily resonance, intentions as visible in action and the shared situational context in order to explain social understanding (Gallagher 2001, 2008; Zahavi 2001, 2008; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009; Stawarska 2009).”
The Affordances for Social Psychology of the Ecological Approach to Social Knowing (2007, background): “In a series of publications, Gallagher (2001, 2005a, 2005b) has explored links between phenomenology and social cognition.”
Making enactivism even more embodied (2014, background): “This view is usually worked out in contrast to theory of mind (ToM) approaches that emphasize mindreading by either theoretical inference or simulation (Gallagher 2001; 2005; 2008).”
Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility (2015, unknown): “See, for instance: De Jaegher (2009), De Jaegher, Di Paolo, and Gallagher (2010), Gallagher (2001, 2005, 2008a, 2008b), Gallagher and Hutto (2008), Gallagher and Zahavi (2007), Hutto (2004, 2007, 2008, 2009), Hutto and Ratcliffe (2007), Kiverstein (2011), Morton (1980, 1996, 2003, 2007), Ratcliffe…”
The Brain — A Mediating Organ (2011, background): “In these, we normally don’t use any imaginative, introspective simulation or inference; instead, we immediately perceive the other’s intentions and emotions in his expressive behaviour as related to a meaningful context (Scheler 1923/1954; Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962, pp 215ff; Gallagher 2001, 2008).”
Mindreading in Infancy (2013, background): “The latter kind of view may be found in the sensorimotor contingency accounts of early mindreading provided by Gallagher (2001, 2004) and Hutto (2004, 2008).”
Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis (2009, background): “…states, (3) that representation allows us to plan how to act in a socially appropriate manner, and (4) we respond by executing that plan with motor commands as best as possible (for a critical analysis of these kinds of inference and simulation-based approaches, cf. Gallagher 2001; Zahavi 2001).”
Emotion and ethics: An inter-(en)active approach (2009, background): “…developmentally primary, but “remains primary in all face-to-face intersubjective experiences, and it subtends the occasional and secondary intersubjective practices of explaining or predicting what other people believe, desire or intend in the practice of their own minds” (Gallagher 2001, p. 91).”
Self–other contingencies: Enacting social perception (2009, methodology): “…include that they are overly cognitivist and individualist (Hutto 2004), i.e., that there is a lack of attention to the embodiment of social agents (Gallagher 2001; Stawarska 2006), a neglect of the interaction process (Gallagher and Hutto 2008; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 2008; De Jaegher…”