Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm (2013, unknown): “Pesendorfer and Swinkels [1997] have built on this researchby investigating a sequence of auctions{Ar} in which bothnr andkr increase.”
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, background): “(1996) follows the lines of Pollard (1984). The theorem can be proven using Hoeffding’s inequality, and generalizes the Dvoretzky et al.”
Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values (2000, unknown): “Such a characterization is also lacking in Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1999), who remark that "As a consequence of the two-dimensional type space we have not been able to prove existence of equilibrium.”
Appendix to "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets" (2009, background): “For example , in the context of double auctions , Thomas Gresik and Mark Satterthwaite ( 1989 ) , Aldo Rustichini , Sattherwaite , and Steven Williams ( 1994 ) , Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Jeroen Swinkels ( 2000 ) , Swinkels ( 2001 ) , Drew Fudenberg , Markus Mobius , and Adam Szeidl ( 2005 ) , and Ma”