Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature

By Benjamin E Hermalin, Michael S. Weisbach. 2001

484 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/61c6461a43bd05585661df716453006932e04cbf

Citations in the corpus

• Entrepreneurial Access and Absorption of Knowledge Spillovers: Strategic Board and Managerial Composition for Competitive Advantage (2006, unknown): “However, as AUDRETSCH AND LEHMANN 157 Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) reported, the empirical evidence supporting the prevailing agency theory approach is mixed.”
• Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Management (2009, unknown): “…such as independence, size, and director background on the one hand and firm performance, CEO compensation, CEO turnover, and earnings management on the other hand (see, e.g., Klein (2002), Farber (2005), Larcker, Richardson, Tuna (2005), and, for a survey, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)).”
• Corporate Governance, Family Ownership and Firm Value: The Canadian Evidence (2005, unknown): “Past empirical evidence has generally failed to find any significant relationship between board composition and firm performance and recent surveys of the literature conclude that the evidence on this matter is at best ambiguous (Dalton et al. , 1998; Bahjat and Black, 1999, 2001; Hermalin and Weisb”
• When Are Outside Directors Effective (2010, unknown): “September 2009 ∗ We appreciate helpful comments from Bernard Black, Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo, Serdar Dinç, Charles Hadlock, Rebecca Hann, Kevin J. Murphy, Zekiye Selvili, Geoffrey Tate, Mark Weinstein, Michael Weisbach, an anonymous referee, and workshop participants at the NBER 2007 Summer In”
• OVERCONFIDENCE, CEO SELECTION, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2008, unknown): “…both in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbox) as well as recent corporate governance research (e.g., Adams and Ferreira (2007), Almazan and Suarez (2003), Harris and Raviv (2006), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003), Lorsch and MacIver (1989), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Song and Thakor (2006)).”
• Monitoring bank performance in the presence of risk (2014, unknown): “Even if distinguishing between voluntary and unexpected replacements is important, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Huson et al. (2004) report that a voluntary CEO departure can be due to retirement or the acceptance of an external position.”
• Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The Case of Acquiring CEOs (2007, unknown): “The corporate governance literature has not settled on any one measure of the strength of the board (see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for a review), and specific measures of governance can be most relevant for different aspects of firm behavior.”