OVERCONFIDENCE, CEO SELECTION, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
By Anand M. Goel, Anjan V. Thakor. 2008
845 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d861f96338bd65389777379a9586cc584cc786bf
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Nihat Aktas
- A. Lawrence
- Eric de Bodt
- Mostafa Monzur Hasan
- Richard Roll
- Markus K. Brunnermeier
- Kari Joseph Olsen
- Terrance Odean
In Finance
- Markus K. Brunnermeier
- Franklin Allen
- A. Lawrence
- Laura L. Veldkamp
- Richard Roll
- Mostafa Monzur Hasan
- Nihat Aktas
- Eric de Bodt
Citations in the corpus
- In Pursuit of Greatness: CEO Narcissism, Entrepreneurial Orientation, and Firm Performance Variance (2013, neutral): “, 2011), and build upon recent studies that suggest prominent leadership traits may have both positive and negative firm implications (Goel and Thakor, 2008; Judge et al., 2009).”
- Are Overconfident CEOs Better Leaders? Evidence from Stakeholder Commitments (2017, neutral): “An open question is why boards appoint overconfident CEOs (Goel and Thakor, 2008; Gervais, Heaton, and Odean, 2011) when evidence suggests that CEO overconfidence causes over–investing, costly mergers and acquisitions, and loose accounting practices.7 However, recent studies find a ‘bright side’ of…”
- The Origin of Failure: A Multidisciplinary Appraisal of the Hubris Hypothesis and Proposed Research Agenda (2014, background): “For example, Goel and Thakor (2008) found that overconfident individuals are more likely to move up the ladder and be promoted to CEO than are rational executives.”
- Stock price crash risk: review of the empirical literature (2018, positive): “But Goel and Thakor (2008) show that in a tournament setting, overconfident managers are more likely to become executives because they perceive less risk and therefore take more chances.”
- Industry Tournament Incentives (2018, positive): “Increasing firm risk, through investment or financial policy, for example, can generate uncertain but extreme performance that increases the likelihood a CEO or other executive is promoted over peer CEOs.24 Goel and Thakor (2008) provide a model that 23 We are grateful to Nagpurnanand Prabhala for d”
- The evolutionary psychology of leadership (2014, background): “…leaders, resulting in higher social status (Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012; Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Driskell & Mullen, 1990), and contributing to the selection of overconfident team leaders (Reuben, Rey-Biel, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2012), and even CEOs (Goel & Thakor, 2008).”
- Tournament Incentives, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies (2012, background): “…2006), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Core and Guay (2002), Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) for a review of this literature. corporate behavior, Goel and Thakor (2008) also theoretically model the relation between tournament incentives and corporate risk taking.”
- The influence of CSR on firm value: an application of panel smooth transition regression on Taiwan (2017, background): “Goel and Thakor (2008) found an inverse relationship between CSR and business performance, in which managers may overinvest in CSR in an attempt to quickly build social capital and company reputation, diminishing shareholder equity.”
- CEO Optimism and Incentive Compensation (2014, neutral): “Potential explanations concerning why agents with biased beliefs may rise to the rank of CEO in the first place are provided, for example, by Englmaier (2007, 2010, 2011) and Goel and Thakor (2008).”
- Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, background): “2 Goel and Thakor (2008) show analytically that executives faced with tournament incentives”