The IMF and Economic Development

By J. Vreeland. 2003

642 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/608f673b647189c1a7af57fc1a65a690ad2a675f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Development

In Economics and Econometrics

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid (2010, background): “This suggests that the poor record of IMF aid in Africa might be the result of poorly enforced conditionality rather than the use of the wrong policy conditions (Vreeland 2003).”
IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–2014 (2016, background): “It is possible that some governments requested specific policy conditions to overcome domestic opposition to reforms (G€uven 2012; Vreeland 2003), and that some programmes were interrupted or not fully implemented (Arpac, Bird, and Mandilaras 2008).”
The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective? (2013, background): “6 The measure of democracy is a binary indicator of whether the chief executive and the legislator are both filled through contested elections, where “contested” is defined by the observation that incumbents face some probability of losing, and they actually step down from office when they do.”
The Scope of IMF Conditionality (2008, methodology): “The content of conditionality in IMF programs is the subject of bargaining between the Fund and the borrower, and this theoretical setting has implications for the appropriate econometric strategy+ Because bargaining involves the strategic use of threats to block agreement, I use data on which count”
The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence (2008, background): “…Vreeland find that the association between currency reserves and the IMF decision to offer a program is insignificant (Przeworski and Vreeland 2002, Vreeland 2003), although they do find that the IMF is significantly more likely to extend financing to countries with current account deficits…”
Bureaucrats or Politicians (2004, neutral): “A similar role may be served by other international bureaucracies, such as the IMF, when it prescribes "unpopular" policies to macroeconomically unstable countries (Vreeland 2003).”
IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies (2006, background): “29 E.g., Conway (1994), Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000), Goldstein and Montiel (1986), Khan (1990), Pastor (1987a, 1987b), Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), Reichmann and Stillson (1978),Vreeland (2003). economic factors do not completely explain compliance.”
Sovereign Bonds and the “Democratic Advantage”: Does Regime Type Affect Credit Rating Agency Ratings in the Developing World? (2007, methodology): “…and help repay debt obligations+ However, because of selection effects and endogeneity issues, we decided not to present models with an IMF influence measure+ See Jensen 2004; and Vreeland 2003+ Still, we tested the effects of IMF structural adjustment programs on bond ratings, using a dummy…”
Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions? (2007, positive): “See Vreeland (2003). 44 Other studies confirm that economic need also certainly helps guide World”
Why Do Governments and the imf Enter into Agreements? Statistically Selected Cases (2003, background): “…I study two analytically significant cases: (1) the case observed with the highest level of foreign reserves participating in an IMF program, that is, Uruguay in 1990, and (2) the case observed with the lowest level of foreign reserves not participating in an IMF program, that is, Tanzania…”