The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence

By M. Steinwand, R. Stone. 2008

190 citations recorded by the source corpus.

A review of recent quantitative studies on the International Monetary Fund reveals that much of the conventional wisdom is incorrect. Recent studies have demonstrated a new degree of methodological rigor, have drawn more heavily upon insights from political science, and have asked a number of new questions. We review studies of participation in IMF programs, design of IMF conditionality, implementation and enforcement of IMF conditions, conventional program effects and catalytic effects. At every stage, we find substantial evidence of the influence of major IMF shareholders, of the Fund’s own organizational imperatives, and of domestic politics within borrowing countries. We conclude that very little is known with certainty about the effects of IMF lending, but that a great deal has been learned about the mechanics of IMF programs that will have to be taken into account in order to obtain unbiased estimates of those effects.

Subfields: Development, Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a30e56ae2524abea44a0ecf27aef441107aa872d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Development

1. Jeffrey M. Chwieroth
2. S. Rickard
3. T. Caraway
4. M. Anner
5. R. Stone
6. Valentin Lang
7. J. Vreeland
8. M. Steinwand

In Information Systems

1. Jeffrey M. Chwieroth
2. R. Stone

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Jeffrey M. Chwieroth
2. S. Rickard
3. T. Caraway
4. M. Anner
5. R. Stone
6. Valentin Lang
7. Lindsay R. Dolan
8. Richard Clark

Citations in the corpus

• Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending (2010, unknown): “Despite an extensive empirical literature, scholars continue to disagree about the key factors explaining this variation in IMF lending (Joyce 2004; Steinwand and Stone 2008).”
• International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality (2012, background): “Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates for the negative binomial regression of the intrusiveness of labor market reform conditions on plp and key control variables+ The coefficient estimates provide evidence that the potential power of domestic labor influences the design of IMF loan conditions+ ”
• IMF conditionality: theory and evidence (2008, unknown): “40For a detailed summary, see Haque and Khan (1998), Bird (2001) or Steinwand and Stone (2008).”
• “The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending (2012, background): “Since the sample of countries participating in IMF programs is systematically different from the overall population, statistical analyses of IMF loan commitments must address the issue of non-random selection (Steinwand and Stone 2008).”
• The Scope of IMF Conditionality (2008, background): “…and Jensen 2007; Eichengreen, Gupta, and Mody 2006; and Stone 2002 and 2004+ For a review of the recent quantitative literature on IMF lending, see Steinwand and Stone 2008+ 11+ See Polak 1991; Gould 2003 and 2006; Copelovitch 2004; and Dreher and Jensen 2007+ 12+ The only systematic…”