Bureaucrats or Politicians

By A. Alesina, Guido Tabellini. 2004

148 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7072a4a8b8b22b3ee268f2b4226ce5db01e6f626

Citations in the corpus

• The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View (2004, unknown): “5 For a recent formal discussion of electoral accountability versus “experts” see Dewatripont Jewitt and Tirole (1999a,b) and Alesina and Tabellini (2003).”
• Decentralization and Political Institutions (2007, unknown): “Therefore, strong parties provide political incentives for local politicians to conduct efficient policies and help to internalize externalities of local policies.(5) Moreover, strong national party systems provide political incentives for local governments irrespective of whether local politicians ”
• Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents (2005, unknown): “Concluding Remarks References Appendix A: Proofs Appendix B: Sorting on Motivation The Suntory Centre Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines London School of Economics and Political Science Discussion Paper Houghton Street No.”
• Cultural Heritage: Economic Analysis and Public Policy (2006, unknown): “implemented with the institution of independent agencies, or incomplete, in the sense that politicians and bureaucrats interact, where the bureaucrat is assigned some goals by the politicians and chooses the tools to fulfil them [Alesina and Tabellini (2004)].”