The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment
By D. Pettit, Joshua Knobe. 2009
195 citations recorded by the source corpus.
: A series of recent studies have shown that people's moral judgments can affect their intuitions as to whether or not a behavior was performed intentionally. Prior attempts to explain this effect can be divided into two broad families. Some researchers suggest that the effect is due to some peculiar feature of the concept of intentional action in particular, while others suggest that the effect is a reflection of a more general tendency whereby moral judgments exert a pervasive influence on folk psychology. The present paper argues in favor of the latter hypothesis by showing that the very same effect that has been observed for intentionally also arises for deciding, in favor of, opposed to, and advocating.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Information Systems and Management, Social Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b145e9b201379ef9cda4a3a9057d84b51cf065d7
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In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Jonathan Schaffer
- Joshua Knobe
- Hugh Mccann
- Wesley Buckwalter
- James R. Beebe
- Tania Lombrozo
- Kevin Uttich
- Adam Feltz
In Social Psychology
Citations in the corpus
- Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed (2012, background): “Notice that this story is constructed in such a way that Mary’s evidence allows her to eliminate certain possibilities but not others.”
- Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect. (2010, unknown): “While a variety of explanations for the effect have been offered (Adams & Steadman, 2004; Knobe, 2006; Machery, 2008; Nadelhoffer, 2004), no single proposal successfully accounts for all the data collected to date (Pettit & Knobe, 2009).”
- Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional Action (2011, unknown): “(Pettit and Knobe, 2009)].”