Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content

By Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin. 2012

918 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5da99429fdf2d7501c74616eca857de9022f9ecf

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Citations in the corpus

How to Entrain Your Evil Demon (2017, background): “The alternative is a model that sees mind as non-representational, extended, situated, embodied or enactive (Hurley 1998; Noë 2004; Gallagher 2005; Thompson 2007; Clark 2008; Hutto and Myin 2013).”
Loving and knowing: reflections for an engaged epistemology (2019, background): “The question of whether enaction can “scale up” beyond “low level” embodied cognition points to so-called “high-level” forms of cognition in ways that we should address (de Bruin and de Haan 2012; Cowley and Nash 2013; Hutto and Myin 2013).”
Musical creativity and the embodied mind (2018, background): “Iyer, V. (2004a). Exploding the narrative in jazz improvisation.”
Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind (2017, background): “and Noë, 2001); autopoietic (or classical) enactivism, which grounds cognition in autonomous organization of biological entities (Varela, 1979, 1997; Weber and Varela, 2002); participatory sense-making enactivism, which understands cognition as relying on interactions between autonomous agents (De J”
Schemas and Frames (2018, background): “…located in persons, our definition is not compatible with those who deem them “virtual” objects, irreducible to “any particular location in space or time” (Sewell 1992:8).4 Second, we define schemas as lacking specific content (see also Hutto and Myin 2012, 2017; Rumelhart and Ortony 1977:101-5).”
Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency (2017, background): “Hutto and Myin’s critique of autopoietic enactivism becomes explicit when approaching the notions of meaning and value (that they equate with that of content).”
Embodiment and embodied design (2014, background): “These findings have led some scholars to go so far as abolish traditional conceptualizations of mental representation and rearticulate cognition in terms of agent–environment dynamics (Chemero, 2009; Clark, 2013; Hutto & Myin, 2013; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).”
Making enactivism even more embodied (2014, background): “In neuroscience we have the work of Berthoz (2000), 55 The Helmholtzian idea that perception involves subpersonal inferences may or may not be correct (see Bennett and Hacker 2003; Orlandi 2012; Hutto and Myin 2013).”
Scaffoldings of the affective mind (2015, background): “…one extreme of this dimension is the internalist position according to which the mind supervenes on the brain only (e.g., Adams & Aizawa, 2001; Searle, 1992); at the other extreme is the externalist view according to which the mind is necessarily constituted by the environment (Hutto & Myin, 2013).”