CEO reputation and stock-based compensation

By Todd Milbourn. 2003

592 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5ae2715650d119bef24cd0c28219f145c19a464a

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Citations in the corpus

Quantifying Managerial Ability: A New Measure and Validity Tests (2012, background): “Milbourn (2003) documents that more able managers have higher pay-for-performance sensitivities, using CEO tenure, prior media mentions, appointment from outside of the firm, and prior industry-adjusted stock returns as a proxy for managerial ability.”
Does managerial ability facilitate corporate innovative success (2015, unknown): “In addition to the Demerjian et al. (2012) measure, we also employ two other measures of managerial ability following Milbourn (2003), Rajgopalet al. (2006),Franciset al. (2008), and Baik et al. (2011).”
Vice or Virtue? The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Executive Compensation (2011, methodology): “To the extent that a good reputation increases a CEO’s outside career opportunity and therefore his/her bargaining power, the overinvestment explanation predicts a positive association between CSR engagement and CEO compensation (Milbourn 2003).”
CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality (2008, unknown): “appointed from outside the firm, a proxy for reputation used by Milbourn [2003] and Rajgopal et al.”
Ready, AIM, Acquire: Impression Offsetting and Acquisitions (2015, background): “…research suggests high-reputation actors are held to higher standards and are more strongly repudiated formissteps than low-reputation firms (e.g., Milbourn, 2003; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006), other studies suggest reputation protects firms and reduces the negative outcomes experienced…”
Managerial Ability and Earnings Quality (2013, methodology): “…main measure of managerial ability (hereafter, the MA-Score) is developed in Demerjian et al. (2012), although we perform robustness checks using historical returns, media citations, and manager fixed effects (e.g., Fee and Hadlock 2003; Milbourn 2003; Francis et al. 2008; Dyreng et al. 2010).”
Corporate Socially Responsible Investments: CEO Altruism, Reputation, and Shareholder Interests (2014, background): “Fourth, our paper adds to the recent literature regarding the important interactions between media coverage and corporate decision-making (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Milbourn, 2003).”
Peer Choice in CEO Compensation (2012, unknown): “Finally, our third measure, the extent of media coverage, is based on the idea that the business press tends to cover CEOs who are recognized as talented, high achievers, or role models in their industries (see Falato et al., 2011; Milbourn, 2003; Rajgopal et al., 2006).”