CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives

By Li Jin. 2002

414 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5a06a5670cee23fcb5adb8110c776c415db2f58b

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Citations in the corpus

Board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector (2017, background): “First, we take idiosyncratic risk as the main proxy of corporate risk taking because it is highly likely that it would be affected by the decisions of the board of the directors (Jin, 2002).”
Customer Concentration Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital (2016, methodology): “For example, Jin (2002) uses industry average risk measures as instruments for firm-specific risk measures.”
Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad (2006, neutral): “5 Jin (2002) shows that the lack of indexation for the average executive is perfectly consistent with efficient contracting .”
CEO Risk-Related Incentives and Income Smoothing (2009, positive): “These results confirm the theoretical expectations of Jin (2002). In”
Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities (2010, methodology): “Larger values of Γ, however, provide greater confidence that results are robust to hidden bias. Smaller values of Γ indicate that results are sensitive to hidden bias, thereby confounding inferences from the analysis. Future research should consider identifying threshold Γ values, perhaps through ga”
Executive Stock Options, Differential Risk-Taking Incentives, and Firm Value (2012, background): “Since CEOs are generally presumed to be able to trade the market portfolio (Jin, 2002; Garvey and Milbourn, 2003), we focus on the hedging benefit of taking systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk.”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, neutral): “While Lambert and Larcker (1987), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), and Jin (2002) nd a negative relationship, Core and Guay (1999), Oyer and Schaefer (2005), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) document a positive one, and Garen (1994), Yermack (1995), Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1996), Ittner,…”
Australian Chief Executive Officer Remuneration: Pay and Performance (2006, background): “Some literature provides evidence supporting an alternative view, that CEOs grow their firms to achieve higher pay rather than because it is in the best interests of their shareholders (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004 ).”
Leverage decision and manager compensation with choice of effort and volatility (2004, background): “We also thank Héctor Chade, Li Jin, Fulvio Ortu, Rafael Repullo, Manuel Santos, Luigi Zingales, and seminar participants at HEC (Montreal), NYU, McGill, USC, Princeton, Wharton, BI (Oslo), Copenhagen School of Business, California Institute of Technology, Florida International University, CEMFI, ASU”