Trends in Corporate Governance

By Benjamin E Hermalin. 2005

537 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/55c0ca31db5f0918d6e742e796917da2f7fab8b5

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Citations in the corpus

Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005 (2010, background): “Alternatively, changes in managerial pay over time may have been driven by other factors, such as the development of alternative job opportunities for executives (Kaplan and Rauh 2006), improvements in board diligence (Hermalin 2005), and the rise in peer group benchmarking (Murphy 1999).”
Corporate governance and operating performance of Chinese listed firms (2011, background): “For example, Hermalin (2005) finds that a more diligent”
CEO Replacement under Private Information (2010, background): “Our model 2 Our notion of match quality borrows from Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Hermalin (2005).”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “There is no evidence that corporate governance has weakened over the past 40 years; instead, most indicators show that shareholders have been empowered and governance strengthened over this period (Holmström and Kaplan, 2001; Hermalin, 2005; Kaplan, 2008).”
Risk and CEO turnover (2010, background): “These include the costs of finding a new CEO, costs due to disruption of business, etc. (see, e.g., Hermalin, 2005).”
The Executive Turnover Risk Premium (2014, result): “First, we note a difference to the mechanism proposed by Hermalin (2005).”
What do boards really do? Evidence from minutes of board meetings. (2013, unknown): “In contrast, most of the supervisory-based models examine the way in which the board’s monitoring intensity affects the board’s decision to retain or fire the CEO (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Graziano and Luporini, 2003; Hermalin, 2005; Dominguez-Martinez, Swank, and Visse”
OVERCONFIDENCE, CEO SELECTION, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2008, unknown): “32 Hermalin (2005) shows that the option of firing the CEO in the future biases the board towards a candidate whose ability is known less precisely.”