Heuristics and Biases: The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence

By Dale W. Griffin, Amos Tversky. 2002

1,661 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/51a47bf77dd1825876fa09daf26c0bb17f5f5fbc

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Citations in the corpus

Effects of Amount of Information on Judgment Accuracy and Confidence (2008, background): “The present studies are part of a larger, ongoing effort to understand the processes that underlie confidence and its calibration with accuracy of judgments and choices (e.g., see Doherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Juslin & Olsson, 1997; Klayman, Soll”
Behavioural Finance: A Review and Synthesis (2007, neutral): “In a recent attempt to do this Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006) test the argument of Griffin and Tversky (1992) that agents overreact to the strength of a signal (e.g., the warmth of a recommendation letter) and underreact to its weight (the letter-writer’s reputation).”
Believing one's own press: the causes and consequences of CEO celebrity (2004, background): “Overconfidence refers to the exaggerated sense that one can predict or produce a desired future outcome (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Griffin and Tversky, 1992).”
Judgmental aggregation strategies depend on whether the self is involved (2011, background): “We had conjectured that small samples might lead to more extreme weighting of the judges, and consequently lower accuracy, assuming that the observed feedback was transformed directly into weights without correcting for sample size (cf. Griffin & Tversky, 1992).”
Why Do Individual Investors Disregard Accounting Information? The Roles of Information Awareness and Acquisition Costs (2018, neutral): “…trailing returns (e.g., Grinblatt & Keloharju 2000; Kaniel et al. 2008; Barber & Odean 2008), potentially because the representativeness heuristic motivates investors to believe that return trends will continue or reverse in a predictable fashion (Griffin & Tversky 1992; Barberis et al. 1998).”
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. (2002, background): “…neglect of base-rate in categorical prediction, the neglect of scope in willingness to pay, the neglect of sample size in evaluations of evidence (Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), and the neglect of probability of success in evaluating a program of species preservation (DeKay…”
MAPS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: A PERSPECTIVE ON INTUITIVE JUDGMENT AND CHOICE (2003, methodology): “This particular example is fictitious, but the pattern of findings indicates that respondents would derive much more confidence from (3R, 0W) than from (7R, 3W) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Griffin & Tversky, 1992).”
Overconfidence in investment decisions: An experimental approach (2005, background): “Overconfidence was found to be strongest for questions of moderate to extreme difficulty (Griffin and Tversky 1992), and seems to increase with the personal importance of the task (Frank 1935).”