The transparency of experience

By M. Martin, P. Block, Naomi Boghossian, Keith Eilan, J. Hossack, P. Hornsby, Mark Noordhof, Scott Sainsbury, Jerry Sturgeon, Valberg and 9 more. 2002

685 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/50993aa34e6dc4240a56babd378c54c6e5dbf181

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

Citations in the corpus

The Limits of Self-Awareness (2004, neutral): “7 See in particular Martin (2002).”
Appearance and Illusion (2014, background): “Problems with sense-datum theories are discussed in Austin 1962 and Martin 2002.”
Symposium on S. Butterfill and I. Apperly, "How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind" (2013, background): “…debates about whether it is possible to see things without seeing that something is the case (e.g. Dretske 1969), about whether and in what sense seeing is a representational notion (Martin 2002; Tye 2002), and about whether vision is intrinsically a source of knowledge (Cassam 2008), for example.”
Attention, Visual Consciousness and Indeterminacy (2011, background): “Others argue that the phenomenal character of conscious vision should be identified with the qualitative character of the objects we see (Campbell, 2002; Martin, 2002).”
Perception and Content (2006, background): “For example, Martin (2002) objects that it is inconsistent with the transparency of experience, properly construed; Campbell (2002) objects that it fails to do justice to the intuitively explanatory role of perceptual experience in connection with the very possibility of demonstrative thought about…”
ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT (2010, background): “…perceptual state is individuated by what it is a direct awareness of , it we may be led to the disjunctivist view ( Fish , 2009 ; Hinton , 1973 ; Martin , 2002 ; McDowell , 1982 ; Putnam , 1999 ; Snowdon , 1979 – 80 ) that veridical , illusory and hallucinatory cases share " no positive mental…”
Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content (2009, background): “33 These are related to the problems with developing a causal theory of perception on the model of Grice (1961 ⁄ 1989); for a nice summary, see the opening section of Noë (2003).”
In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience (2009, background): “not have representational content (as found, for instance, in Campbell 2002, Martin 2002, Travis 2004,”
Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery (2015, methodology): “This is the so-called Dependency Thesis (Peacocke 1985; Martin 2002, see also Noordhof 2002 for analysis).”
Perception and imagination: amodal perception as mental imagery (2010, methodology): “(Martin 2002, p. 410) When we represent the occluded parts of perceived objects, we use mental imagery in this latter sense: in a way that would allow us to localize the imagined object in our egocentric space.”