The Limits of Self-Awareness
By M. Martin. 2004
490 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/13e3469213af25f672cd3f96585c407b30603ce4
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
Citations in the corpus
- Appearance and Illusion (2014, background): “…with belief states19, but one could accept the idea that appearances are explained in 18 Disjunctivist theories of experience (e.g., McDowell 1986, Martin 2004) also claim that perceptual experience is constituted by objects, so that an experience which involves perceptual awareness of an object,…”
- Why explain visual experience in terms of content (2010, background): “…experience, so it does not after all honor the naive intuition that in the veridical case ones has R by virtue of simply seeing the redness and roundness of something, even though the main argument for it was supposed to be that it honors this intuition (for this argument, see Martin 2004: 59, 64).”
- ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT (2010, background): “…; Martin , 2002 ; McDowell , 1982 ; Putnam , 1999 ; Snowdon , 1979 – 80 ) that veridical , illusory and hallucinatory cases share " no positive mental characteristics other than their epistemological properties of not being knowably different from some veridical perception " ( Martin , 2004 , p .”