Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

By Roger B. Myerson. 1978

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1. Chao Yu
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Citations in the corpus

• Discovering Diverse Multi-Agent Strategic Behavior via Reward Randomization (2021, background): “This is related to the problem of equilibrium refinement (or equilibrium selection) (Selten, 1965; 1975; Myerson, 1978), which aims to find a subset of equilibria satisfying desirable properties, e.g., admissibility (Banks & Sobel, 1987), subgame perfection (Selten, 1965), Pareto efficiency (Bernheim…”
• The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence (2012, methodology): “Note that this equilibrium refinement is similar to the notion of a Proper Equilibrium first discussed in Myerson (1978).”
• Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games (1995, background): “The idea that players make in nitesimal errors underlies some of the re ne-ments literature (Myerson 1978, Selten 1975).”
• Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection (2017, background): “This rationale is similar to proper equilibria (Myerson (1978)).”
• Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept (1983, methodology): “In this chapter, we will consider various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept for this class of games, all of which require an equilibrium to satisfy some particular robustness condition. In section 2.2, perfect equilibria (SELTEN [1975]) are considered.”
• A Course in Game Theory (1995, background): “1 of van Damme (1983). Proposition 61.2 is due to Pearce (1984, p. 1035). The result in Exercise 56.4 is due to Gabay and Moulin (1980), Bernheim (1984), and Moulin (1984).”
• Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling (2001, background): “However, the criterion is silent as to what restrictions should be placed on beliefs about the likelihood that it is a type 2 consultant rather than a type 3 or type 4.15 The “properness” criterion proposed by Roger Myerson (1978) focuses on the relative advantage to doing so.”