Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept

By Eric E. C. van Damme. 1983

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Citations in the corpus

Discovering Diverse Multi-Agent Strategic Behavior via Reward Randomization (2021, background): “This is related to the problem of equilibrium refinement (or equilibrium selection) (Selten, 1965; 1975; Myerson, 1978), which aims to find a subset of equilibria satisfying desirable properties, e.”
Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions (2001, background): “16 See van Damme [20] for a good exposition.”
An agenda-based framework for multi-issue negotiation (2004, background): “For sequential offer protocols, the Nash equilibrium concept was strengthened in several ways by requiring that the strategies stay in equilibrium at every step of the game [39].”
Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (2005, methodology): “The idea of using stochastic choice via a mixed strategy as a solution to an optimization problem contrasts sharply with the introduction of decision errors in the analysis of refinements, as in Selten (1965, 1975) and Myerson (1978). The highly sophisticated concepts they developed (perfection and ”
Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out contracts (2010, background): “4 Other papers that investigate labor-market tournaments include Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Mookherjee (1984), and Rosen (1986).”
Refinement of Strong Stackelberg Equilibria in Security Games (2011, methodology): “We develop a solution based on the notion of equilibrium refinement, which is common in the game theory literature (Carlsson and van Damme 1993; Kreps and Wilson 1982; Myerson 1978; Selten 1975).”