Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors

By K. Peasnell, P. Pope, S. Young. 2003

150 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4dd5a722d6fd51f27a4f4b7bffa375c83bdc254c

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Citations in the corpus

An Integrated Framework of Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation - Evidence from Switzerland (2004, unknown): “The average leverage ratio of 62.34% is very similar to the values reported by Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2003), Schmid (2003), and Drobetz and Fix (2003) for Switzerland and Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2003) for the UK.”
Does one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure (2007, background): “Likewise, Jensen (1993, p. 866) argues that separating the two positions is essential for board effectiveness since a chairman CEO cannot perform control functions “apart from his or her personal interest.””
The Determinants of Board Size and Composition: Evidence from the UK (2008, result): “Our findings are consistent with previous findings (Young, 2000; Peasnell et al., 2003; Hillier and McColgan, 2006; Lasfer, 2006; Dahya and McConnell, 2007)”
Firm Performance: Do Non-Executive Directors Have a Mind of Their Own? Evidence from Uk Panel Data (2007, unknown): “These figures corroborate findings by Faccio and Lasfer (1999), Peasnell et al. (2003),”
The effect of audit committee characteristics on intellectual capital disclosure (2012, unknown): “Nevertheless, Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2003) and Peasnell et al. (2005) note that although the two corporate governance systems are different, the UK approach shares many of the key features of the US system.”
Agency theory and corporate governance: a review of the literature from a UK perspective (2001, background): “The Market Reaction to Director Appointments Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that a company’s stock price rises significantly upon the announcement of an outside director to the company board.”
Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment (2007, unknown): “Likewise, Peasnell et al. (2003) demonstrate that an insider-dominated board is optimal in some situations,”
Board Characteristics and Firm Performance: Evidence from New Zealand (2011, background): “Peasnell et al. (2003) also find substitution between managerial ownership and board composition.”