Trustworthy Hardware: Identifying and Classifying Hardware Trojans

By Ramesh Karri, Jeyavijayan Rajendran, Kurt Rosenfeld, M. Tehranipoor. Computer, 2010

510 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Hardware and Architecture

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4d9d3df6f23afef5605ae45b46deb30ffe13894f

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In Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience

In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

In Hardware and Architecture

Citations in the corpus

Security analysis of logic obfuscation (2012, background): “EPIC [1] obfuscates the design by randomly inserting additional gates; only a correct key makes the design to produce correct outputs. vVe demonstrate that an attacker can decipher the obfuscated net.list, in a time linear to the number of keys, by sensitizing the key values to the output.”
On design vulnerability analysis and trust benchmarks development (2013, unknown): “We have developed innovative methodologies that, for the first time, more effectively address the problem.”
Hardware Trojan Attacks: Threat Analysis and Countermeasures (2014, background): “The area and power overhead relative to the design in which the Trojan is inserted has to be an undetectable fraction, in order to evade detection by obvious means [29].”
A Comprehensive Review of Cyber Security Vulnerabilities, Threats, Attacks, and Solutions (2023, background): “These malicious software variants cause excessive use of computer resources, reduce performance, and cause the system to shut down by consuming excessive power supply [45].”
A Primer on Hardware Security: Models, Methods, and Metrics (2014, background): “Microcontrollers are extensively used in embedded systems, and they are equipped with ‘‘fuse bits’’ to prevent unauthorized users from reading or modifying selected sections of its memory.”
SARLock: SAT attack resistant logic locking (2016, background): “These malicious agents can pirate the IP, overbuild ICs for illegal sale, tamper the ICs to insert malicious circuitry in the form of Hardware Trojans (HTs), or reverse engineer the netlist from an IC for unlicensed use [2].”
On Improving the Security of Logic Locking (2016, background): “Finally, rogue elements in the foundry may insert malicious circuits (hardware Trojans) into the design without the designer’s knowledge [5].”