Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: abnormalities in the awareness of action.

By ChrisD . Frith, Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, D. M. Wolpert. Brain research. Brain research reviews, 2000

751 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Psychiatry and Mental health, Social Psychology, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4bdc6ddae01173bcda846c320e8e371ba99c2da4

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Citations in the corpus

The Sensations of Everyday Life: Empirical, Theoretical, and Pragmatic Considerations (2001, background): “Authors have proposed that delusions emerge from attempts to make meaning out of this increasingly undifferentiated sensory input (Frith et al., 2000; Light & Braff, 2000).”
Computational neuroanatomy of speech production (2012, background): “Perceptual modulation is an important aspect of control circuits — forward predictions can be viewed as a form of perceptual modulation 41,99–101 — and within the HSFC framework, such a mechanism may allow somatosensory inputs to fine tune temporal aspects of forward auditory predictions.”
The sense of agency – a phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes (2017, background): “This view is compatible, for example, with speculations by Frith et al. (2000a) regarding the underlying neurological abnormalities in patients with delusions 4 That is not to say that sensorimotor behaviours or schemes cannot be anticipative in nature, but rather that each scheme, if required, may…”
Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. (2003, background): “…feedback ("efference copy") that indexes the willed or intentional nature of human action or, in a more recent formulation, a failure in the comparator mechanism that derives predicted consequences of an action from a cognitive model of an intended sequence of motor commands (Frith et al. 2000).”
Behavioral and Brain Functions (2005, neutral): “It is notable that some of the latter functions incur parietal activity that was reported to be high in imaging studies of patients with marked IoR [62].”
Sensorimotor Integration in Speech Processing: Computational Basis and Neural Organization (2011, positive): “It has recently been suggested that this symptom results from dysfunction in generating forward predictions of motor speech acts (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007) see also (Frith et al., 2000).”
Predictive Processing: A Canonical Cortical Computation (2018, positive): “This would likely resemble positive symptoms of schizophrenia, as has been argued previously (Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Frith, 2000).”
Computational principles of sensorimotor control that minimize uncertainty and variability (2007, neutral): “Thishasled tothesuggestionthatschizophreniaresultsinpartfrom adeﬁcitinpredictingthesensoryconsequencesofone’s actions(Feinberg,1978;Frith,1992;Frith et al. 2000).”
Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. (2003, positive): “It has been suggested that patients prone to psychosis, especially in the context of schizophrenia, show biases in probabilistic reasoning and a tendency to “jump to conclusions” (94, 95), alterations in attributional styles (96, 97), differences in their “theory of mind” (98), and abnormal levels o”
Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency. (2008, neutral): “As articulated by Frith, in schizophrenia patients ''something is wrong with the generation of a forward model and the representation of the predicted state of the system'' (Frith et al., 2000).”
Self-face recognition activates a frontoparietal "mirror" network in the right hemisphere: an event-related fMRI study (2005, positive): “Dysfunction in frontoparietal networks have been linked to abnormalities in awareness of action and selfmonitoring deficits (Frith et al., 2000a,b).”
The Phenomenological Mind (2007, positive): “processes that keep our actions on track as they develop, and prior to getting any sensory feedback about them) generate a phenomenal experience of agency (e.g. Blakemore et al. 2002; Frith et al. 2000; Gallagher 2000a, 2000b; Marcel 2003; Wolpert and Flanagan 2001).”