Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self.

By Louis Sass, Josef Parnas. Schizophrenia bulletin, 2003

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How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

EASE: Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (2005, methodology): “Our own clinical psychopathological approach is very much informed by the Husserlian approach to phenomenology [Parnas and Zahavi, 2002; Sass and Parnas, 2003].”
Temporality and psychopathology (2013, background): “53 Cf. on the concept of schizophrenic hyperreflexivity, Sass 1992a; Sass and Parnas 2003; Stanghellini”
Understanding beliefs (2015, background): “…and “mineness” of experience are most able to develop an accurate model of reality due to an existential distance; that is, the distancing from subjective experience and taking on the role of an “observer” [for example, the concept of “hyperreflexivity” in Sass and Parnas’ (2003) account].”
Phenomenology and Psychopathology (2010, background): “This includes: (1) a weakening of the basic sense of self or ipseity (Sass and Parnas 2003) and (2) a disruption of implicit bodily functioning in the dimensions of both perception and action.”
The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception (2007, background): “On this proposal, it is also possible to explain how there can be some degree of loss of sense of minimal self in perception for people suffering from schizophrenia (Parnas et al. 1998; Sass and Parnas 2003).”