An Evolutionary Approach to Norms
By Robert Axelrod. 1986
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Mark Schaller
- D. Kenrick
- Joel Z. Leibo
- Jon K. Maner
- Marc Lanctot
- Chi-Yue Chiu
- Farshad Kooti
- Ying-yi Hong
Citations in the corpus
- Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas (2017, background): “, direct reciprocity [4, 5, 6, 7], indirect reciprocity [8], norm enforcement [9, 10], simple reinforcement learning variants [3], multiagent reinforcement learning [11, 12, 13, 14, 15], spatial structure [16], emotions [17], and social network effects [18, 19].”
- Any animal whatever. Darwinian building blocks of morality in monkeys and apes (2000, background): “As Axelrod (1986) discussed, an especially powerful mechanism by which cheating can be deterred emerges when punishment against defectors becomes linked with negative indirect reciprocity, or punishment of nonpunishers.”
- Neighbors, Knowledge, and Nuggets: Two Natural Field Experiments on the Role of Incentives on Energy Conservation (2013, unknown): “Since all of the individuals sampled in the second field experiment consume more than the average customer, the social norm information should theoretically have a negative impact on utility and enhance effort to reduce energy consumption ei; assuming offline norms are more salient, the norm effect ”
- The impact of psychological contracts upon trust and commitment within supplier–buyer relationships: A social exchange view (2006, background): “Whilst trust is inherent within social exchange relationships, the construct cannot simply materialize but evolves through some form of socialization process (Axelrod 1986; Jones and George 1998; Williams 2001) that embodies high levels of interaction between parties.”
- Cooperation Emergence under Resource-Constrained Peer Punishment (2016, methodology): “In Axelrod’s metanorm model [1], a population of agents play a game in which each agent has to decide between coop-”
- Escaping the green prison: Entrepreneurship and the creation of opportunities for sustainable development (2010, background): “These types of institutions have received the most attention in the economic study of endogenous institutional change (Alston et al., 1996; Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod, 1986; Young, 1993).”
- Human Natures, Nature Conservation, and Environmental Ethics (2002, background): “…Dunbar et al. 1999, Ehrlich 2000) and a substantial one on the evolution of ethics and norms— which is of special interest to those of us concerned with human behavior toward the environment (Bischof 1978, Axelrod 1986, Alexander 1987, Boyd and Richerson 1992, Cronk 1994, Boehm 1997, Katz 2000).”
- Dynamical Evolutionary Psychology: Mapping the Domains of the New Interactionist Paradigm (2002, background): “Other theoretical analyses—abetted by computer simulations—have focused more explicitly on the ways in which emerging cultural norms depend on the interpersonal dynamics of social influence ( Axelrod, 1986; Kenrick et al., in press).”
- The Emperor’s Dilemma: A Computational Model of Self‐Enforcing Norms1 (2005, background): “3 To the 3 Norms mandating the enforcement of other norms are sometimes referred to as “me-tanorms” (Axelrod 1986; Horne 2001).”
- Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward) (2011, unknown): “This treatment was exactly the same as the Intermediation Game except subjects spent four minutes before the game writing on four blank sheets of paper for a minute apiece reflecting on four questions: (1) Why might the first mover sell the game? (2) Why might the first mover not sell the game? (3) ”
- Normology: Integrating insights about social norms to understand cultural dynamics (2015, background): “economics (Akerlof, 1976), political science (Axelrod, 1985), psychology (Ajzen, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990), public”
- Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (2010, unknown): “Robert Axelrod (1986) posits that individuals who adopt meta norms related to whether others follow the norms that have evolved in a group increase the probability that norms will be followed.”
- Runaway Social Selection for Displays of Partner Value and Altruism (2007, background): “Departments of Psychiatry, Psychology, and Research Center for Group Dynamics at the Institute for Social Research University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI, USA nesse@umich.edu”
- Coevolution of economic behaviour and institutions: towards a theory of institutional change (2003, unknown): “Other mechanisms to support a norm system are dominance, internalisation, deterrence, social proof, membership, law and reputation (Axelrod, 1986).”