Election Goals and Income Redistribution: Recent Evidence From Albania

By Anne Case. 2001

337 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations

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In Political Science and International Relations

Citations in the corpus

Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil (2012, background): “2 The “swing voters” hypothesis with respect to intergovernmental transfers has received empirical support for Albania (Case 2001) and Sweden (Johansson 2003).”
The regional allocation of infrastructure investment: The role of equity, efficiency and political factors (2005, background): “…and Craig and Heikkila, 1989), or other recent papers that focus on political motivations driving the territorial distribution of intergovernmental grants and other public programs (e.g., Levitt and Snyder, 1995, Cadot et al., 1999, Case, 2001, Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002 and Johansson, 2003).”
Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralised Public Spending (2006, background): “Since evidence for the political-tactical distribution of grants has been found in countries as diverse as Albania (Case, 2001), Austria (Worthington and Dollery, 1998), Sweden, and the United States (Grossman, 1994), but not in Australia (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991), it might be assumed…”
Intergovernmental Grants as Signals and the Alignment Effect: Theory and Evidence (2015, background): “There are a number of papers that establish, for various countries, that political alignmentwith the center generates higher levels of discretionary grant to the local government, for example, Levitt and Snyder (1995) and Larcinese et al. (2006) for the US, Solé-Ollé and SorribasNavarro (2008) for S”
Electoral Goals and Center-State Transfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India (2008, background): “In column (6) of table 6, we show that nothing substantive is altered if a dummy variable is used”
The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy (2007, methodology): “block grants from federal to sub-federal governments in Albania, Case (2001) found that”
The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain (2006, methodology): “tests of the probabilistic voting model applied to the distribution of funds across districts ( Case, 2001; and Dalhberg and Johanssen, 2003).”
The Political Economy of Expenditures by the Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES), 1991–95 (2000, background): “…support predictions made in the literature on " political business cycles " (Nordhaus 1975, Rogoff 1990) as well as the literature on political influences on the allocation of discretionary funds (Wright 1974, Cox and McCubbins 1986, Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, Dixit and Londregan 1996, Case 1997).”
GROWTH, INEQUALITY AND POVERTY: SOME HARD QUESTIONS (2004, background): “See Besley and Case (2003), Case (2001), Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003), Drazen (2000), Besley and Coate (2003).”
Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana (2011, background): “Similar to the finding that governments targeted more resources to their core supporters as in Barkan and Chege (1989) and Miguel and Zaidi (2003), Case (2001) found that block grants to districts in Albania increased with the president‟s vote share in the previous election.”
Government Transfers and Political Support (2009, neutral): “Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) find support for the swing voter model using the introduction of discretionary funds in Sweden, while others find evidence of core (infra-marginal) voters being disproportionately targeted for redistribution (Case 2000 on Albania, Schady 2002 on Peru, and Green 2006b on”
Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain (2012, background): “The proportion of swing voters ψ uses to be proxied in the literature by the incumbent’s vote margin (Case, 2001; Johansson, 2003; Solé-Ollé, 2006; Besley et al., 2006; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2009; Fiva, 2009).”
Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India (2007, background): “Spending also tends to be greater in states or districts that are core supporters, or where a larger proportion of voters are “swing” voters (Schady, 2000; Case, 2001; Strömberg, 2001; Johansson, 2003).”
Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-1994 (2008, neutral): “diverse as Albania (Case 2001), Argentina (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Porto and Sanguinetti 2001), Australia (Denemark 2000; Worthington and Dollery 1998), Brazil (Ames 2001), Canada (Kneebone”
Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities (2003, methodology): “Case (1998) uses this theory together with the Lindbeck & Weibull model as a framework when investigating the determinants of block grants in Albania.”
Do local officials know something we don't? Decentralization of targeted transfers in Albania (2002, background): “Moreover, as mentioned, in the absence of a transparent allocation procedure, the magnitude of grants reflects voting patterns ( Case, 2001 ).”
Old Problems in the New Solutions? Politically Motivated Allocation of Program Benefits and the “New” Fertilizer Subsidies (2011, background): “Barkan and Chege (1989), Miguel and Zaidi (2003), and Case (2001) find that governments gave preferential treatment to their core supporters and that higher transfers or resources went to areas in which the incumbent president’s vote share was higher the previous election.”