Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India

By Stuti Khemani. 2007

163 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8ed9f327909883413ac52b46c00fda8e55ef442d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Brian Min
2. Miriam A. Golden
3. W. Arulampalam
4. Bhaskar Dutta
5. A. Banful
6. N. Mason
7. E. Tominey
8. Paul Gregg

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Brian Min
2. Miriam A. Golden
3. W. Arulampalam
4. Bhaskar Dutta
5. A. Banful
6. N. Mason
7. Jacob Ricker-Gilbert

Citations in the corpus

• Distributive Politics Around the World (2013, background): “Porto & Sanguinetti (2001) study intergovernmental grants in Argentina; Khemani (2007), intergovernmental grants in India; Pereira (1996), intergovernmental grants in Portugal; and Dall’erba (2005 and other papers), the use of Structural Funds in the European Union, funds aimed at improvements in…”
• Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana (2011, background): “The finding is that resources from the political body are distributed such that Indian states with the same political affiliation as the national government receive greater amounts; especially those states where the party controls only a small proportion of seats in the national legislature.”
• Electoral Goals and Center-State Transfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India (2008, background): “4Two related papers that use Indian data are Rao and Singh (2001) and Khemani (2007).”
• Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance (2010, unknown): “Evidence for India has found that fiscal transfers became much less politically determined when they were transferred to an independent agency (Khemani 2007).”
• Old Problems in the New Solutions? Politically Motivated Allocation of Program Benefits and the “New” Fertilizer Subsidies (2011, background): “Khemani (2007) and Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) also find evidence of politically aligned agencies targeting benefits to swing voters.”