Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities

By E. Johansson. 2003

285 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1c495094b4be82b8834a95d92d459571c32ed647

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Citations in the corpus

Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil (2012, background): “2 The “swing voters” hypothesis with respect to intergovernmental transfers has received empirical support for Albania (Case 2001) and Sweden (Johansson 2003).”
Essays on the Contribution of Public Infrastructure to Private Production and its Political Economy (2001, background): “Recently, it has also been suggested in the literature that grants are used as tactical (electoral politics) instruments for buying support of marginal voters (‘swing voter’ approach, e.g. Dixit and Londregan, 1998; Johansson, 1999).”
Intergovernmental Grants as Signals and the Alignment Effect: Theory and Evidence (2015, background): “This system is estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), and then we perform a Chi-square test for joint hypothesis that AL is insignificant in all regressions (zero discontinuity).”
Macroeconomic Effects From Government Purchases and Taxes (2011, unknown): “Applications of this type include Wright (1974) and Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005) for spending across political jurisdictions by the US government during the New Deal and Johansson (2003) for spending by Swedish municipalities.”
Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralised Public Spending (2006, background): “It has been shown that not only earmarked discretionary grants are used in this way (Dahlberg and Johansson, 1999), but also non-earmarked grants with a formulabased distribution mechanism (Johansson, 2003).”
Dynamic Commitment and the Soft Budget Constraint: An Empirical Test (2010, background): “29 For Swedish studies, see Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Johansson (2003).”
The Effects of Partisan Alignment on the Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers: Differences-in-Differences Estimates for Spain (2008, unknown): “For example, Johansson (2003) and Dahlberg and Johansson (2004) estimate a vote density function for each municipality and then compute the ‘cutpoint’ density.”
On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments (2002, methodology): “The 2 See, e.g., Bungey, Grossman and Kenyen (1991), Grossman (1994), and Johansson (2002).”
The regional allocation of infrastructure investment: The role of equity, efficiency and political factors (2005, background): “Johansson (2003) computes this variable after a doing a kernel estimation of a different density for each region, using individual data on vote-results and personal treats.”
Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana (2011, background): “Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) determine that municipalities with”
The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy (2007, background): “Also for the Swedish case, Johansson (2003) tested the Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998) model and reported evidence that municipalities with a high number of swing voters receive a higher proportion of intergovernmental grants.”
The Contribution of Local Public Infrastructure to Private Productivity and its Political Economy: Evidence from a Panel of Large German Cities (2002, background): “Recently, it has also been suggested in the literature that grants are used as tactical (electoral politics) instruments for buying support of marginal voters (‘swing voter’ approach, e.g. Dixit and Londregan, 1998; Johansson, 1999).”
Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain (2012, background): “incumbent’s vote margin (Johansson, 2003; Besley et al., 2006; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2009; Fiva, 2009).”
Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India (2007, background): “Spending also tends to be greater in states or districts that are core supporters, or where a larger proportion of voters are “swing” voters (Schady, 2000; Case, 2001; Strömberg, 2001; Johansson, 2003).”