Government Transfers and Political Support

By Marco Manacorda, Edward Miguel, Andrea Vigorito. 2009

368 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5033eaed4f98b6e6076203a6a92155acc5ece375

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Citations in the corpus

When Payouts Pay Off: Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior in Brazil 2002-10: CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR (2013, background): “Work by Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2011) is particularly relevant to this point.”
Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program (2016, unknown): “They can provide theoretical support for the empirical findings that voters’ electoral choices respond to economic conditions (Wolfers (2009)), natural disasters (Cole, Healy, and Werker (2012)), and quasi-random targeted transfers (Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2011)).”
Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil (2012, background): “Martin (2003) shows that Republican areas receive less federal money from a Congress controlled by democrats.”
Making Progress on Foreign Aid (2015, unknown): “Two other studies find that foreign aid can reduce political accountability, but that this problem can be mitigated by providing recipients with more information about aid allocation (Manacorda et al 2011, Guiteras & Mobarak 2014).”
Conditional Cash Transfers, Civil Conflict and Insurgent Influence: Experimental Evidence from the Philippines (2016, background): “23 Manacorda et al. (2011) found similar evidence that a CCT program increased popular support for the incumbent president in Uruguay.”
Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico (2013, background): “To name just a few examples, Cerda and Vergara (2008) estimate that in Chile throughout the 1990s direct welfare payments were electorally profitable, and Manacorda et al. (2010) find that a cash transfer in Uruguay generated support for the incumbent party even after the discontinuation of the prog”
Vote-Buying and Reciprocity (2011, unknown): “Recently, Manacorda et al. (2011) show that recipients of a cash transfer program supported the incumbent government and this support continued on even after the program ended.”
How Lasting is Voter Gratitude? An Analysis of the Short- and Long-Term Electoral Returns to Beneficial Policy (2011, unknown): “Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2009) provide a first step in this direction.”
Digging into the Pocketbook: Evidence on Economic Voting from Income Registry Data Matched to a Voter Survey (2017, background): “4 Consistent with this, studies that examine micro-level data from transfer programs in developing economies find significant pocketbook voting (Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito 2011; PopEleches and Pop-Eleches 2012; Richter 2006).”
Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance (2012, background): “Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2009) found that households that benefited from a cash transfer in Uruguay were more likely to give lasting political support to the current relative to the previous government.”