The Political Economy of Expenditures by the Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES), 1991–95

By Norbert R. Schady. American Political Science Review, 2000

323 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/71a22337c4b9ac6eb09f7b68e03dbb18ff349abd

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Citations in the corpus

When Payouts Pay Off: Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior in Brazil 2002-10: CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR (2013, unknown): “On the latter, most studies tend to converge to the finding that government transfers matter positively (Levitt and Snyder 1997; Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches, 2012; Schady, 2000).”
Clientelism and Social Funds: Evidence from Chávez's Misiones (2007, background): “Schady provides a very interesting empirical account of how Fujimori removed technocratic administrators from the administration of FONCODES to put in more loyal personnel when he was facing electoral pressures in 1994 (Schady 2000, 294).”
Beyond Clientelism (2008, unknown): “Considerable debate exists on whether clientelist parties target swing voters (Dahlberg & Johanson, 2002; Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Schady, 2000; Stokes, 2005) or core supporters (Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, & Magaloni, 2006; Magaloni, 2006).”
Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador (2006, background): “…the percentage of households with access to piped water supply, and the percentage of children (5-12 year olds) enrolled at school.25 Following Schady (2000), we acknowledge the possible effect of electoral considerations by the party in office at the central government level on the…”
Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-1994 (2008, unknown): “…and Stephan 2006), Germany (Stratmann and Baur 2002), India (Rao and Singh 2005), Japan (Horiuchi and Saito 2003), Mexico (Magaloni 2006, ch. 4), Peru (Schady 2000), Russia (Treisman 1996), South Korea (Kwon 2005), and Sweden (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002), as well as across Africa (Kasara 2007).”
Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India (2007, background): “Spending also tends to be greater in states or districts that are core supporters, or where a larger proportion of voters are “swing” voters (Schady, 2000; Case, 2001; Strömberg, 2001; Johansson, 2003).”
What Drives the Swing Voter in Africa (2013, unknown): “It is unclear whether parties more effectively win voters by targeting persuadable “swing voters” (Magaloni et al. 2007; Schady 2000; Stokes 2000), by rewarding core supporters (Yarahuan 2006), or through some combination of both (Dunning and Stokes 2010).”
The diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfer programs in the Americas (2011, background): “In some countries, safety net programs were widely criticized as vehicles for patronage politics and ruling party vote buying (Bruhn, 1996; Fox, 1994; Schady, 2000).”