A Fine is a Price

By Uri Gneezy, Aldo Rustichini. The Journal of Legal Studies, 2000

1,942 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Gender Studies, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4860041ca03b8ef0da343d988b54251fccab50d9

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Citations in the corpus

An institutional analysis of payments for environmental services (2010, background): “Going back to normative persuasion may not work either as the norm may be ruined simply by including payments — e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b).”
Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All (2000, background): “This is indeed the case in a related eld study {Gneezy and Rustichini 2000} that we conducted on the effect of penalties.”
Psychological foundations of incentives (2001, neutral): “Taken together, the stylized facts of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) can therefore be neatly explained by the interaction between approval incentives and material incentives.”
Pay for Performance in the Public Sector—Benefits and (Hidden) Costs (2010, methodology): “This can be illustrated with a field experiment of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b).”
Do Markets Erode Social Responsibility (2015, background): “Specifically, we varied the degree of competition between firms in the market, the information that consumers have about the types of available products, and the cost of becoming informed about the characteristics of products.”
Field experiments across the social sciences (2017, background): “According to Gneezy & Rustichini (2000), the fine commodified late pickups.”
Chapter 6 – The Personnel Economics of the Developing State (2017, background): “While a number of studies have documented such adverse effects in such activities as volunteer work (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000) or blood donation (e.g., Mellstrom and Johannesson, 2008), it remains to be seen whether this is a first-order issue in the context of governments.”
Undermining trust and cooperation : The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas (2006, background): “Similar ideas have been put forward in economics by Fehr and Falk (2001) and Frey and colleagues (Frey, 1993, 2000; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) who argue that a Wnancial incentive for moral behavior undermines the moral underpinning of that behavior by transforming norm violations into a kind of ma”
Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence (2000, neutral): “Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini (2000).”
Incentives to Exercise (2008, background): “The first is the “crowding-out” hypothesis, according to which paying people for an activity (such as exercising) might destroy their intrinsic motivation to perform the task once the incentives are removed (Deci, 1971, Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b, Frey and Jegen, 2001).”
Citizen and consumer: the dual role of individuals in environmental policy (2006, background): “For an overview of psychological literature on this subject, see Deci (1999); for a survey of empirical evidence, see Frey and Jegen (2001); for economic experimental evidence see, e.g. Frey (1997), Frey and Götte (1999), Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000).”