The Nature of Diversified Business Groups: A Research Design and Two Case Studies
By Pankaj Ghemawat, Tarun Khanna. 2003
568 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4724c69fcd1210bbf0c8437c6981e14990ad8ba6
How researchers see this paper
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In Accounting
- Mike W. Peng
- Yi Jiang
- Garry D. Bruton
- R. Hoskisson
- Eric Gedajlovic
- Igor Filatotchev
- D. Ahlstrom
- K. Meyer
In Economics and Econometrics
- Mike W. Peng
- Garry D. Bruton
- R. Hoskisson
- Yi Jiang
- Eric Gedajlovic
- Ishtiaq P. Mahmood
- D. Ahlstrom
- Yishay Yafeh
In Finance
- Mike W. Peng
- Eric Gedajlovic
- Laszlo Tihanyi
- R. Hoskisson
- Murali D. R. Chari
- Parthiban David
- Benny Schneider
- Yishay Yafeh
Citations in the corpus
- The Evolution of Concentrated Ownership in India Broad patterns and a History of the Indian Software Industry (2004, unknown): “We will turn, in each of the next two sections, to considering two potential explanations for concentrated ownership in an emerging economy like India (Ghemawat and Khanna 1998; Khanna 2000).”
- In search of the drivers of high growth in manufacturing SMEs (2006, background): “This supports the contention of Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) and Dierickx and Cool (1989) that many group owned firms are less likely to engage in the more risk prone and/or longer term projects.”
- The Influence of National Culture and Institutional Voids on Family Ownership of Large Firms: A Country Level Empirical Study (2009, unknown): “Overcoming such institutional voids is very tough in some countries because the ruling politicians and policy makers may themselves have selfish interests in favoring the elite business families instead of creating a level playing field for everyone by removing institutional voids (Douma et al., 200”
- Exploring the relation between family involvement and firms' financial performance: A meta-analysis of main and moderator effects (2012, background): “And, these inequities embolden high family involvement firms to exercise inordinate amounts of power over political and economic bodies to protect their own interests and revenue (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Morck and Yeung, 2003, 2004).”
- Transforming disadvantages into advantages: developing-country MNEs in the least developed countries (2008, unknown): “Developing-country MNEs come from countries that have lower government effectiveness, and are therefore more used to dealing with a slow, politically dependent bureaucracy and lack of high-quality public goods (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998).”
- Leverage and business groups: Evidence from Indian firms (2007, methodology): “Using a case study of two large Business Houses in India, Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) find evidence for the policy distortion view on groups.”