Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

By Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik, Karen K. Nelson. 2000

189 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4314b288ee6885c081048042a25024637f541feb

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Measuring Securities Litigation Risk (2012, methodology): “7 Nelson and Pritchard (2008) use a reduced form of the model used in Johnson et al. (2000), with separate indicator variables for representation in the biotech, computer hardware, computer software, retail, and electronics industries.”
Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs (2010, background): “To control for frivolous lawsuits, we first restrict our attention to the period after the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (passed in 1995), which was designed to reduce frivolous lawsuits (e.g., Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson 2000, and Choi 2007).”
Shareholder Litigation Rights and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits (2018, background): “Further, frivolous litigations often lead to substantial wealth transfers to attorneys at the expense of the company (Romano, 1991; Johnson et al., 2000).”
Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value? (2010, unknown): “…Schipper and Thompson (1983), Chow (1983), Sefcik and Thompson (1986), Karpoff and Malatesta (1989), (1995), Brook, Hendershott, and Lee (1998), Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson (2000), Berger, Li, and Wong (2005), Greenstone et al. (2006), Li, Pincus, and Rego (2008), Chhaochharia and Grinstein…”
Do the Merits Matter Less after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (2006, unknown): “Spiess and Tkac (1997) and Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson (2000) both report a significant positive abnormal return for dates around the time of Congress’s override of President Clinton’s veto of the PSLRA, consistent with the view that the PSLRA increased shareholder welfare for firms in high…”
Jeopardy, Non-Public Information, and Insider Trading Around SEC 10-K and 10-Q Filings (2005, unknown): “…that is 1 if the firm is reported to have been sued by Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (http://securities.stanford.edu) in a given year on characteristics of the firm.23 The construction of these estimates closely follows the methodology described in Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson (2000).”
Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, methodology): “First, to control for market-related incentives and strike suits, we include cumulative stock returns, return skewness, and turnover as controls (Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson, 2000).”