Do the Merits Matter Less after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act

By Stephen J. Choi. 2006

129 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6ac7e9e877a44788b69394378d9f7a7a6e240c8b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Irene Y. Kim
2. David D. Williams
3. Douglas J. Skinner
4. Steven E. Kaplan
5. Yongcheol Shin
6. Danny Yagan
7. Christian Leuz
8. W. Megginson

In Economics and Econometrics

1. David D. Williams
2. Douglas J. Skinner
3. Steven E. Kaplan
4. Irene Y. Kim
5. Mary B. Curtis
6. Rafik Z. Elias
7. Zhihong Chen
8. Brandon Julio

In Finance

1. Irene Y. Kim
2. David D. Williams
3. Douglas J. Skinner
4. Steven E. Kaplan
5. I. Wang

Citations in the corpus

• Do Going Concern Audit Reports Protect Auditors from Litigation? A Simultaneous Equations Approach (2013, background): “However, research on whether the merits are more or less important after PSLRA reaches mixed conclusions (Choi 2007; Johnson et al. 2007).”
• Corporate Securities Fraud: Insights from a New Empirical Framework (2013, unknown): “The reason for starting at year 1996 is to restrict attention to the period after the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which was designed to reduce frivolous lawsuits (e.g., Johnson, Kasznik and Nelson, 2000; Choi, 2007).”
• Measuring Securities Litigation Risk (2012, methodology): “Choi (2006) uses a high technology industry dummy as an explanatory”
• Shareholder Litigation, Reputational Loss, and Bank Loan Contracting (2014, unknown): “5Following Choi (2007) we eliminate five lawsuits with small settlements (less than $2 million in litigation-year dollars).”