Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results

By Karine Gandolfi, C. Mourtel, Francis Olivier. Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2001

1,493 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, Hardware and Architecture

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/419b718b87d216820ee2f6ef076d9889f4aac6ee

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Citations in the corpus

Introduction to differential power analysis (2011, methodology): “SPA and DPA techniques applied to EM measurements are termed simple electromagnetic attacks (SEMA) and differential electromagnetic attacks (DEMA) in [39–41].”
Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys (2012, background): “These attacks continuously monitor some aspect of a device throughout a cryptographic operation, such as the device’s power draw (e.g., [25]) or electromagnetic emanations (e.g., [21, 38]).”
Differential Privacy Under Fire (2011, background): “This rules out difficult channels such as power consumption [17] and electromagnetic radiation [13,24], essentially leaving the adversary with just two channels: the privacy budget and the query completion time.”
An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks (2007, neutral): “Characteristics such as running time [18, 6], cache behavior [28], power consumption [19], and electromagnetic radiation [ 15 , 31] have all been exploited to recover secret keys from implementations of dierent cryptographic algorithms.”
Context-Sensitive Fencing: Securing Speculative Execution via Microcode Customization (2019, background): “mizations such as caches, branch speculation, memory disambiguation, and even DVFS, through side-channels such as memory bus activity [4], power consumption characteristics [8], branch access patterns [2, 29], faults [47, 40], acoustics [33, 32], electromagnetic effects [30], functional unit timing ”
Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting (2007, background): “Several side channels [16] [17] [22] [11] [3] and side-channel analysis techniques have emerged over the past decade and have proved to be highly effective in extracting information about the internal operations of embedded devices from their timing, power consumption and electromagnetic (EM)…”
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks (extended version) (2009, background): “In this paper, we investigate the context of side-channel attacks, in which adversaries are enhanced with the possibility to exploit physical leakages such as power consumption [19] or electromagnetic radiation [2, 14].”
TrustLite: a security architecture for tiny embedded devices (2014, background): “We assume that the high levels of integration achievable with modern IC fabrication processes render chip-level invasive attacks such as tampering, on-chip bus probing, extracting keys from on-chip memory or fault injection out of scope for economically motivated attackers and that mitigations are i”
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography (2008, result): “Exposure-resilient functions [5, 9, 20] are functions whose output remains secure, even if an adversary can learn the value of someinput bits, this model has been extensively investigated and very strong results have been obtained.”
Fault Attacks on RSA with CRT: Concrete Results and Practical Countermeasures (2002, methodology): “This attracted a huge amount of research on physical attacks against smartcards in 1996 due to [Koch], [BDL] and again 1999 by [KJJ], followed by [ GMO ,SQ].”
A Stochastic Model for Differential Side Channel Cryptanalysis (2005, neutral): “Power analysis, which was first introduced in [9] and electromagnetic analysis ([8]) are based on the dependency of the side channel information on the value of intermediate data, which is in turn caused by the physical implementation.”
Distributed Differential Privacy and Applications (2015, background): “, through electromagnetic radiation (Gandolfi et al., 2001; Quisquater and Samyde, 2001) or power consumption (Kocher et al.”
Machine learning in side-channel analysis: a first study (2011, background): “time [13], power consumption [14], and electromagnetic emanation [8,17].”