Fault Attacks on RSA with CRT: Concrete Results and Practical Countermeasures
By Christian Aumueller, P. Bier, Wieland Fischer, Peter Hofreiter, Jean-Pierre Seifert. Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2002
297 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Signal Processing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c1cf3725dbf73424a641d3b14a407dc3d737f759
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Jo Van Bulck
- Frank Piessens
- David Naccache
- Daniel Gruss
- Michael Tunstall
- Michael Schwarz
- Stefan Mangard
- Berk Sunar
In Signal Processing
Citations in the corpus
- Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX (2020, background): “While fault attacks have been extensively studied for adversaries with physical access to embedded devices [7, 62, 2, 26], Rowhammer remains, to date, the only known purely software-based fault attack on x86-based systems.”
- Fault Injection Attacks on Cryptographic Devices: Theory, Practice, and Countermeasures (2012, unknown): “For example, the authors of [49] have”
- The Sorcerer's Apprentice Guide to Fault Attacks (2006, background): “Although initially theoretical, this attack (implemented in [17]) stimulated the genesis of a variety of fault attacks against a wide gamut of cryptographic algorithms.”