Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference.

By Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne, M. Braine, Keith J. Holyoak, Howard Margolis, D. O Brien, Monica Bucciarelli, Orlando Espino, Vittorio Girotto, Eugenia Goldvarg and 29 more. Psychology Review, 2002

776 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/40beb17343274a053d64044832f6965d434ebe89

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Citations in the corpus

Logic, probability, and human reasoning. (2015, neutral): “Experiments have corroborated modulations, including those that establish temporal and spatial relations between the events that a conditional describes [71,131,132].”
THE PROBABILITY OF CONDITIONALS (2004, background): “Hence, the interpretative system is not a " truth functional " one, that is, it can never take for granted that the truth of a compound assertion depends merely on the truth values of the clauses that occur in the assertion (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).”
In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning. (2003, background): “Although System 2 processing is clearly implicated in any account of the logical competence that ordinary people can exhibit in deductive reasoning, it should be noted that the dual-process theory does not take sides on the issue of whether this competence is achieved by manipulation of mental model”
Against Logical Form (2010, background): “…inferences as a consequence of the different meanings of conditionals, which are a result of interactions among a small set of simple components (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Girotto, 2008; Byrne & Johnson- Laird, 2009). one component yields a core meaning for…”
Logic, Models, and Paradoxical Inferences (2012, neutral): “Likewise, Evans and Over (2004, p. 153) wrote: 'For us, the original sin of JLB [Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002] theory is their endorsement of the logical validity of the paradoxes of interpreting a natural language conditional as truth functional.”
Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning (2012, background): “p)—often known as the Equation—and not to the probability of the material conditional, P(not-p or q), as implied by theories of conditional reasoning founded in the old binary logic (eg, Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002 ).”
Deontic norms, deontic reasoning, and deontic conditionals (2008, background): “The mental model account of conditionals (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002 ) explains this latter finding by general processes of semantic and pragmatic modulation.”
The Comprehension of Counterfactual Conditionals: Evidence From Eye-Tracking in the Visual World Paradigm (2019, background): “However, visual information such as pictures has been found to impede relational and conditional reasoning, as well as reasoning about negation (e.g., Knauff and Johnson-Laird, 2002; Orenes and Santamaría, 2014).”
Working memory and everyday conditional reasoning: Retrieval and inhibition of stored counterexamples (2005, background): “Currently, reasoning theories mainly focus on a specification of how retrieved counterexamples affect the reasoning process (e.g., Byrne, Espino, & Santamaria, 1999; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Oaksford & Chater, 1998; Politzer, in press; Thompson, 2000).”
Intuitive and Reflective Inferences (2008, background): “selection task ( Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Jones & Sugden, 2001)—a result in sharp”