THE PROBABILITY OF CONDITIONALS

By Vittorio Girotto, Philip N. Johnson-Laird. 2004

52 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We report two studies investigating how naive reasoners evaluate the probability that a conditional assertion is true, and the conditional probability that the consequent of the conditional is true given that the antecedent is true. The mental model theory predicts that individuals should evaluate the probability of a conditional on the basis of the mental models representing the conditional, and that evaluations calling for a greater number of models should be more difficult. It follows that the probability of a conditional should differ from the corresponding conditional probability. The results of the studies corroborated these predictions, and contrast with alternative accounts of naive evaluations of the probability of conditionals.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, General Decision Sciences, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/696906e3819341ea2f3b64adab2e1a3d4e316be2

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Citations in the corpus

Logic, probability, and human reasoning. (2015, unknown): “Some studies support the Equation, although to varying degrees [54,75–80], and others do not [81,82].”
Negation: A theory of its meaning, representation, and use (2012, background): “Studies of conditionals have shown that many individuals make the small scope interpretation of the negation, but some individuals make the correct large scope interpretation (see Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Girotto, 2009; Girotto & Johnson-Laird, 2004).”
The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation (2006, background): “Although it is evident that one would have degrees of belief about this possibility, they cannot be represented in Johnson-Laird’s system, since he has no means to deal with nonextensional probabilities ( Girotto & Johnson-Laird, 2004; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, & Caverni, 1999; Ov”
Mental models and cognitive change (2013, background): “This result is robust, but some individuals do base their judgments on all three possibilities compatible with a conditional (Girotto & Johnson-Laird, 2004).”
Betting on conditionals (2010, background): “The fact that people utter scope ambiguities in “think aloud” studies of conditionals (Girotto & Johnson-Laird, 2004 ) is not evidence that they give these narrow scope interpretations.”