In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning.
By Jonathan Evans. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2003
2,215 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Developmental and Educational Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c73b58599d7dbbb3db987507218a67779dfc0c09
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Josh Tenenbaum
- Yoshua Bengio
- Mohit Bansal
- Brenden M. Lake
- Percy Liang
- Jonathan Evans
- Luke S. Zettlemoyer
- Sergey Levine
In Developmental and Educational Psychology
- K. Stanovich
- Gordon Pennycook
- M. Toplak
- R. F. West
- Josh Tenenbaum
- T. Griffiths
- Jonathan Evans
- Philip N. Johnson-Laird
Citations in the corpus
- PERSISTENCE OF THE INTUITIVE CONCEPTION THAT HEAVIER OBJECTS SINK MORE: A REACTION TIME STUDY WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF INTERFERENCE (2015, background): “We also believe that these “proportional” latencies can be expected to reveal conflicts or competitions between conceptions, or, as it has been argued before, between distinct types of processes, such as experience-based or rule-based processes (Evans, 2003).”
- Why your stigma isn't hired : a dual-process framework of interview bias (2016, background): “Strong beliefs in the initial impression lower the need to reassess the impressions and result in a preference for confirmatory information (Dipboye, 1982; Dougherty et al., 1994; Evans, 2003; Macan & Dipboye, 1988; Nickerson, 1998; Windschitl, Scherer, Smith, & Rose, 2013).”
- Debiasing Decisions (2015, background): “Two-system models of reasoning assume that people initially make an automatic intuitive judgment that can be subsequently accepted, corrected, or replaced by more controlled and effortful thinking: through “System 1” and “System 2” processes, respectively (Evans, 2003; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Sl”
- Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias (2016, background): “(2000), Evans (2003), Kahneman (2011), and Evans and Stanovich (2013).”
- Unpacking Intuition: A Process and Outcome Framework (2011, background): “Finucane et al. (2000) concluded that people draw intuitively on an affect heuristic which improves the efficiency of judgments by deriving risk/ benefit evaluations from a common source, that is, their “gut feel” reactions.”
- Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds (2008, neutral): “Our RR hypothesis bears more than a nominal resemblance to Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) " representational redescription " hypothesis and to the growing family of " dual-process " accounts of reasoning (Evans 2003).”
- Formalizing Neurath’s Ship: Approximate Algorithms for Online Causal Learning (2016, background): “Rather than claiming these are completely different processes (Evans, 2003), the approximate probabilistic inference perspective can accommodate the whole continuum.”
- Integrating psychological and neurobiological considerations regarding the development and maintenance of specific Internet-use disorders: An Interaction of Person-Affect-Cognition-Execution (I-PACE) model. (2016, positive): “…as the outcome of an impulsive and a deliberate cognitive processing mode is consistent with current decision-making theories (e.g., Schiebener and Brand, 2015) and cognitive psychology models of dual-processing in reasoning and thinking (Evans, 2003; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich and West, 2000).”
- Intuitive and Reflective Inferences (2008, background): “Much evidence has accumulated in favour of such a dual view of reasoning (Evans, 2003, in press; for arguments against, see Osman, 2004).”