An Empirical Analysis of the Decline in the Information Content of Earnings Following Restatements

By W. M. Wilson. 2008

303 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4067280e3c5c7521f640c62e59a1140215ea44f8

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Citations in the corpus

CEO Tenure and Earnings Management (2015, unknown): “They argue that in the early years of service, CEO disinvests poorly performing 2 Prior accounting studies have examined reputation of CEOs, directors, and firms in terms of financial reporting credibility (see e.g., Srinivasan, 2005; Farber, 2005; Desai et al., 2006; Wilson, 2008).”
Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements (2009, unknown): “Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the three news proxies: (1) competitors’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement CARi,−τ ,+τ , (2) restating firms’ abnormal returns at the restatement announcement CARj,−τ ,+τ , and (3) the restatement amount Restatj,t. The restatement announceme”
Do Financial Restatements Lead to Auditor Changes (2013, background): “Specifically, these firms are associated with more unclean auditor opinions, shorter auditor tenure and have higher values for: audit fees, losses, leverage, growth, number of segments and negative discretionary accruals.”
The Effects of Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions on Earnings Quality and Auditor Behavior (2012, unknown): “First, our study shows that firm-initiated clawback provisions mitigate the likelihood of financial misstatements and their negative impacts as documented in many previous studies (e.g., Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Palmrose et al., 2004; Wilson, 2008).”
Nonfinancial Disclosure and Analyst Forecast Accuracy: International Evidence on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (2013, background): “More credible reports are likely to be more informative to analysts (Teoh and Wong 1993; Wilson 2008).”
Signaler Credibility, Signal Susceptibility, and Relative Reliance on Signals: How Stakeholders Change their Evaluative Processes After Violation of Expectations and Rehabilitative Efforts (2017, background): “…and the firm’s earnings—the “bottom line items in the balance sheet and income statement,” respectively (Ohlson, 1995: 661)—as two particularly important firm signals that are used by shareholders to help evaluate a firm (Barth & Clinch, 2009; Francis & Schipper, 1999; Ohlson, 1995; Wilson, 2008).”