CEO Tenure and Earnings Management
By Ashiq Ali, Weining Zhang. 2015
670 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a8a568a3c3e30f41cde41968c263450bca53220f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- A. Zalata
- M. Hiebl
- Martin Plöckinger
- Roman Rohatschek
- Ewald Aschauer
- Collins G. Ntim
- Ernest Gyapong
- C. Louca
In Strategy and Management
- Ernest Gyapong
- A. Zalata
- C. Louca
- E. Sletten
- Martin Plöckinger
- Roman Rohatschek
- Collins G. Ntim
- S. Roychowdhury
Citations in the corpus
- The influence of individual executives on corporate financial reporting: A review and outlook from the perspective of upper echelons theory (2016, background): “In contrast, Ali and Zhang (2015) find that CEOs are more likely to overstate earnings in their early and final years of tenure, which are often decisive for reputation building and performance-based retirement plans. Similarly, Dechow and Sloan (1991) find that CEOs reduce R&D spending in their fin”
- Female CEOs and Core Earnings Quality: New Evidence on the Ethics Versus Risk-Aversion Puzzle (2018, background): “In addition, the length of tenure might affect the ability of a CEO to influence a firm’s financial reporting decisions (Ali and Zhang 2015).”
- CEO age and stock price crash risk (2017, background): “Overstatement of earnings could be more severe when the CEO change is known ex-ante, as in the case of CEO retirements (Ali and Zhang, 2015).”
- Does Litigation Deter or Encourage Real Earnings Management? (2019, positive): “Moreover, for a restricted sample with data available, we confirm that our results are robust to controlling for CEO tenure, where we include both its first and second power (to allow for potential non-linearity, see Ali and Zhang 2015).”