Pay for Performance? Government Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts

By Tod Perry, M. Zenner. 2001

374 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, positive): “documented by Perry and Zenner (2001) in a similar context; real compensation levels increased dramatically following enhanced compensation disclosure and the enactment of 162(m) in 1993.”
Further Evidence on Compensation Committee Composition as a Determinant of CEO Compensation (2003, background): “The general direction of these changes is in agreement with evidence by Perry and Zenner (2001), who find greater pay sensitivities after the reforms.”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, positive): “This tax change (combined with changes to disclosure rules around the same time) appears to have had large e¤ects (Perry and Zenner, 2001): First, it slowed the growth of salaries that were already above, at, or close to $1 million.”
The Effect of Compensation Committee Quality on the Association between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Performance (2009, neutral): “Like Perry and Zenner (2001), Vafeas (2003a) examines the effect of the regulatory reforms such as the 1992 SEC compensation disclosure rules and the 1993 tax legislation (i.e., Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m)) on executive compensation practices.”