Further Evidence on Compensation Committee Composition as a Determinant of CEO Compensation

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The Effect of Compensation Committee Quality on the Association between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Performance (2009, unknown): “(4) Director shareholdings – Directors’ governance quality may be higher for directors with high shareholdings as the extent to which interests of directors can be aligned with those of shareholders is positively associated with directors’ shareholdings (Shivdasani, 1993; Vafeas, 2003b).”
CEO Compensation and Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Purchase Price Allocation (2010, unknown): “As to CEOs’ influence on compensation contracting, Sridharan (1996) finds a positive correlation between measures of CEO influence over the board and CEO compensation, whereas Vafeas (2003) finds that insider participation in the compensation committee is related to CEO pay.”
Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating (2012, background): “Finally, whereas most studies look at reputation penalties for the whole board, we focus on specific committees, in particular, the CC, which has received relatively little attention (e.g., Newman and Mozes, 1999; Vafeas, 2003; Agrawal and Nasser, 2010).”
Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance (2009, background): “(2) Long-serving directors are likely to be more effective because of their greater experience (e.g., Vafeas 2003b).”