Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts

By Martin A. Lariviere, Evan L. Porteus. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2001

1,106 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/38bbe4cb081b42078fda91bde8a422030aad3a18

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In Management Information Systems

In Management Science and Operations Research

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

On the Advantage of Quantity Leadership When Outsourcing Production to a Competitive Contract Manufacturer (2013, result): “A similar assumption can be found in other operations management and marketing research studies, including those of Lariviere and Porteus (2001) and Cui et al. (2008).”
Game Theory in Supply Chain Analysis (2004, background): “See Lariviere and Porteus [53] for an example with a supplier that establishes the wholesale price and a newsvendor that then chooses an order quantity and Cachon [18] for the reverse scenario in which a retailer sets the wholesale price and buys from a newsvendor supplier.”
Stochastic Stackelberg Equilibria with Applications to Time Dependent Newsvendor Models (2013, neutral): “Stackelberg games for single period newsvendor problems with fixed retail price have been studied extensively by Lariviere and Porteus (2001), providing quite general conditions under which unique equilibria can be found.”
Financing an Agricultural Supply Chain with a Capital‐Constrained Smallholder Farmer in Developing Economies (2021, background): “In their inﬂuential work, Lariviere and Porteus (2001) examine a Stackel-berg game between a supplier and a retailer in a newsvendor setting without considering liquidity constraints.”
Equilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint (2012, positive): “Under BCF, (i) the capital-constrained retailer’s order quantity is Q (cid:5) The rationale behind Q (cid:5) B ¼ Q N and the ﬁrst two parts of Proposition 1 follow directly from Lemma 1 and can be inferred from Lariviere and Porteus (2001).”
New Results Concerning Probability Distributions with Increasing Generalized Failure Rates (2012, neutral): “If the valuation distribution of a product has an increasing generalized failure rate (that is, the distribution is IGFR), then the associated revenue function is unimodal, and when the generalized failure rate is strictly increasing, the global maximum is uniquely specified.”
The Newsvendor Problem and Price‐Only Contract When Bankruptcy Costs Exist (2011, background): “The classic paper of Lariviere and Porteus (2001) analyzes the ‘‘selling to the newsvendor problem’’ as the Stackelberg game between the supplier and the retailer without any ﬁnancial constraints.”
Impacts of Power Structure on Supply Chains with Uncertain Demand (2013, background): “Lariviere and Porteus (2001) introduce a concept (generalized increasing failure rate) that helps characterize the equilibrium outcome of a manufacturer Stackelberg game.”