Game Theory in Supply Chain Analysis
By Gérard P. Cachon, Serguei Netessine. 2004
766 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/81486f3b2b9a472f1bb011031a9fc230a1c593bd
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Information Systems
- Shilu Tong
- Albert Y. Ha
- Kenneth L. Schultz
- Elliot Bendoly
- Quan Tian
- Mahesh Nagarajan
- Greys Sošić
- Mingming Leng
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Shilu Tong
- Albert Y. Ha
- Quan Tian
- Mahesh Nagarajan
- Greys Sošić
- Mingming Leng
- Mahmut Parlar
- Karen Donohue
Citations in the corpus
- A supply chain model with direct and retail channels (2008, background): “Chiang et al. (2003) examine a price-competition game in a dual channel supply chain.”
- Behavior in operations management: Assessing recent findings and revisiting old assumptions (2006, methodology): “This research combines traditional OM models of scheduling, inventory planning, quality management, supply chain management , etc., with game theoretic rules and analysis indicative of decentralized decision making environments (e.g., see Cachon and Netessine, 2004 for a review).”
- Demand Functions in Decision Modeling: A Comprehensive Survey and Research Directions (2013, methodology): “Cachon and Netessine (2004) indicated that the quasi-concave method and the supermodular method can be used for proving the existence of equilibrium solution; see Topkis (1979, 1998) for supermodularity.”
- Strategic Technology Choice and Capacity Investment Under Demand Uncertainty (2007, background): “We now provide closed-form solutions for the optimal quantities, while the equilibrium profits can be obtained from (1).”
- Competition and cooperation in a single-retailer two-supplier supply chain with supply disruption (2010, background): “For example, Oke and Gopalakrishnana (2009) suggested some kinds of measures to mitigate supply risks, such as better planning and co-ordination of supply and demand, flexible capacity, identifying supply chain vulnerability points and having contingency plans, and multiple sourcing strategy etc.”
- Co‐opetition and Investment for Supply‐Chain Resilience (2008, unknown): “…is easy to see that:∣∣∣∣∂Psu(y)∂y ∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂Pss(y)∂y ∣∣∣∣ , ∀y ∈ R+ 2 Proposition 1: Proof i) We can define the payoffs in this game as: πss = −tss; πsu = −tsu; πr = −tr We now use Theorem 7 from Cachon and Netessine (2004) which states: Theorem: Suppose the strategy space of the game is convex…”
- Quality Improvement Incentives and Product Recall Cost Sharing Contracts (2009, background): “Therefore, in what follows, we will be focusing on the most preferred equilibrium (Pareto optimal equilibrium) and avoid the issues associated with multiple equilibria when analyzing the effort coordinating contract (Cachon and Netessine 2004).”
- Tourism supply chain management: A new research agenda (2009, background): “Cachon and Netessine (2004) provide a comprehensive overview of the application of GT to SCM problems.”
- Information Sharing in Competing Supply Chains with Production Cost Reduction (2017, background): “…1\Manufacturer 2 Share (X2 S) Not share (X2 N) Share (X1 S) (ΠNSM1 ,Z +V S 1,Z ,Π NS M2 ,Z +VS2,Z) (ΠNNM1 ,Z +V N 1,Z ,Π NS M2 ,Z ) Not share (X1 N) (ΠNSMi ,Z ,Π NN M2 ,Z +VN2,Z) (ΠNNM1 ,Z ,Π NN M2 ,Z ) the outcome of the game because it is preferred by all the players (Cachon and Netessine 2004).”
- Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions (2008, methodology): “This was also pointed out in Cachon and Netessine (2004), which provides a brief (but extensive) literature survey of papers in SCM that adopt cooperative concepts (the core, the Shapley value, and the biform games).”