Are perks purely managerial excess

By R. Rajan, Julie Wulf. 2006

194 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/38b0c653a256eac03abc164b0ce6a684e4d002a9

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Citations in the corpus

The Bright Side of Managerial Over-Optimism (2016, background): “Finally, we define , our fourth measure of effort, as the total length of trips (in hours) to suspected vacation destinations over a quarter (multiplied by minus one), which proxies for CEO’s sacrifice of their leisure time (Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Yermack, 2006; 2014).”
Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005 (2010, background): “…the accuracy of data on perks is limited, and so most research has focused on whether a certain perk was offered rather than on its actual value (Rajan and Wulf 2006, Yermack 2006) On the other hand, evidence from Lewellen (1968) suggests that pensions cannot account for the low rate of growth…”
CSR disclosure and firm performance: The mediating role of corporate reputation and moderating role of CEO integrity (2020, unknown): “CEO perks are a route through which managers can misappropriate a firm's surplus (Rajan & Wulf 2006).”
Sustainable human resource management as a driver in tourism policy and planning: a serious sin of omission? (2018, methodology): “This is affirmed by both Rajan and Wulf (2006) and Solnet et al (2015) who also return to what they describe as an ongoing trend towards organisational flattening at all levels, creating demand for increased empowerment at the front-line.”
The Currency of Reciprocity - Gift-Exchange in the Workplace (2012, unknown): “and growing part of overall compensation takes the form of non-monetary bene ts or perks (see Marino and Zabojnik (forthcoming a) Rajan and Wulf (2006)).”
The Firm Size Distribution Across Countries and Skill-Biased Change in Entrepreneurial Technology (2018, background): “…recent literature on CEOs and CEO pay, which shows that the importance of general skills has risen of late (see e.g. Murphy and Zabojnik 2004, Rajan and Wulf 2006, Frydman 2007).3 These skills are usually measured as the variety of someone’s experience of different industries, companies,…”
The choice of corporate liquidity and corporate governance (2009, background): “For example, a firm’s decision to purchase a corporate jet may be driven by 9 executives’ selfish private rent-seeking motives, as Yermack (2006) details, or may be an outcome of value-enhancing perks to let their executives arrive fresh to crucial negotiations, as Rajan and Wulf (2006) suggest.”