CEO Power and Risk Taking: Evidence from the Subprime Lending Industry
By Krista B. Lewellyn, Maureen I. Muller-Kahle. 2012
257 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/373300b9e5d3d1c2032364d94a358a6b21b8133f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Buthiena Kharabsheh
- Jannine Poletti‐Hughes
- Bruce T. Lamont
- Donald C. Hambrick
- S. F. Shah
- S. Akbar
- Sucheta Nadkarni
- Kari Joseph Olsen
In Economics and Econometrics
- Buthiena Kharabsheh
- Weichun Zhu
- Jannine Poletti‐Hughes
- Bruce T. Lamont
- Donald C. Hambrick
- S. F. Shah
- Kibeom Lee
- Gang Wang
In Finance
Citations in the corpus
- Do CEOs Matter to Firm Strategic Actions and Firm Performance? A Meta-Analytic Investigation Based on Upper Echelons Theory (2016, background): “Lubatkin, & Dino, 2010), and subprime lending specialist (a mortgage industry-specific measure of firm risk taking; Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, 2012).”
- Board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector (2017, background): “Our finding regarding board size is consistent with that of previously published studies in other countries (see e.g., Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, 2012, in the US).”
- Managerial Risk Taking (2016, unknown): “Studies have shown that greater CEO power induces risk taking, for example, engaging in risky subprime mortgage lending (Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, 2012) or strategic deviance from general tendencies (Tang, Crossan, & Rowe, 2011).”