Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory of Delays in Sovereign Debt Renegotiations

By David M. Benjamin, Mark L. J. Wright. 2009

290 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/948fa894484f8c074475fdfeff55f70d8673207d

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Citations in the corpus

Long-Duration Bonds and Sovereign Defaults (Revised July 2009) (2009, methodology): “2See, for instance, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2008), Bai and Zhang (2006), Benjamin and Wright (2008), Cuadra and Sapriza (2006, 2008), D’Erasmo (2008), Eyigungor (2006), Hatchondo et al. (2006, 2007, 2009), Lizarazo (2005, 2006), Mendoza and Yue…”
Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment (2012, unknown): “Specically, the total surplus is (1 )(2) 2V: It follows that the rst creditor to engage receives the cash equivalent of (1 )(2) 2V (1 ) : (5) We let v3 = (1 )(2) V (1 ) denote the undiscounted value of this payo¤ and note that 2v3 is its discounted value.”
Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk (2011, unknown): “This problem (henceforth, debt dilution) has received considerable attention both in academic and policy discussions—see, for example, Bizer and DeMarzo (1992), Bolton and Jeanne (2009), Borensztein et al.”
Fiscal Fatigue, Fiscal Space and Debt Sustainability in Advanced Economies (2013, unknown): “18 Benjamin and Wright (2008) estimate the recovery rate for upper-middle income countries to be about 60-100 percent; hence, for advanced economies we assume an average recovery rate of 90 percent.”
Collectivism and corruption in bank lending (2013, unknown): “…2010), and Sovereign Default, a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country defaulted on its sovereign debt during the 1990-1999 period and 0 otherwise (Benjamin & Wright, 2009), because bank crises and sovereign debt default may intensify the financing obstacles that firms face and thus lead…”
Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium (2022, unknown): “(2014a), we capture in a simple fashion the positive recovery rate of debt in default observed in the data (see Cruces and Trebesch, 2013, and Benjamin and Wright, 2008). Starting from the first period after the government defaults, the government is presented with the opportunity to end the default”
The dynamics of sovereign debt crises and bailouts (2016, unknown): “v(s) = max δ∈{0,1} (1− δ)vND(s) + δ(vD(z(s))− χ(s)) (8)”
A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles (2011, unknown): “(d) Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply Rows (12) and (13) show results for lower (1.”
International Reserves and Rollover Risk (2013, unknown): “(11)Yue (2010) and Benjamin and Wright (2008) present models with endogenous recovery rates.”
Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default (2013, background): “Benjamin and Wright (2008) show for their sample of 90 defaults that indebtedness, measured by the ratio of the face value of debt to GDP, does not fall and may even rise after a default.”