Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations
By Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis. 2007
540 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/41c1437bac0a207bea447b03b099f557f1464592
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
In Safety Research
- Deepak Malhotra
- J. Murnighan
- W. Raub
- Joel Z. Leibo
- Vincent Buskens
- Yochai Benkler
- M.A.L.M. van Assen
- Karl Tuyls
In Sociology and Political Science
- Stefano Pagliaro
- Deepak Malhotra
- J. Murnighan
- R. Bilali
- W. Raub
- Thore Graepel
- Joel Z. Leibo
- Vincent Buskens
Citations in the corpus
- Inequity aversion improves cooperation in intertemporal social dilemmas (2018, background): “Providing an empirically grounded explanation of how individual behavior gives rise to societal cooperation is seen as a core goal in several subfields of the social sciences and evolutionary biology [7, 8, 9].”
- Economics Education and Greed (2011, background): “Their open-ended responses also suggest that exposure to economics promotes greater self-focus and less of an adherence to norms of fairness (Fehr & Gintis, 2007).”
- Micro-Macro Links and Microfoundations in Sociology (2011, methodology): “…that macro-level implications need not be robust relative to variations in micro-level assumptions, and that alternatives to standard rational choice assumptions do yield new implications for macro-outcomes (see Akerlof and Yellen, 1987; Frey and Eichenberger, 1994; Fehr and Gintis, 2007).”
- A Genetic Basis for Social Trust? (2010, background): “Through mechanisms which are not yet clearly understood, trust appears to enable independent actors to overcome collective action problems by providing a ‘firstmover’ incentive for cooperation in situations where there are returns to, and opportunities for, free-riding (Fehr and Gintis 2007).”
- Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game (2010, unknown): “Remarkably enough, however, individuals cooperate much more in public goods situations than expected [16].”
- Constructing a Climate Change Logic: An Institutional Perspective on the "Tragedy of the Commons" (2013, unknown): “Building on Berger and Luckman’s (1968) notion of a socially constructed reality, institutional scholars argue that transnational commons are not predetermined but socially constructed phenomena, in which institutional norms and practices, rather than individualized rational choices, motivate actors”
- Does intelligence foster generalized trust? An empirical test using the UK birth cohort studies (2010, background): “: +44 All rights reserved. betrayed, we would have been better off not trusting in the first place (Fehr & Gintis, 2007; Ostrom & Walker, 2003).”
- Peer production, the commons, and the future of the firm (2017, background): “Extensive work in diverse disciplines over the past quarter century has established that human populations exhibit substantial pro-social motivations, and that they respond to a range of non-material, non-self-interested motivations ranging from reciprocity to group identity through, in some cases, ”
- Beyond Altruism: Sociological Foundations of Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior (2015, unknown): “The key message of this line of research is that people are willing to pay to reward those who contribute and punish those who do not (for reviews, see Fehr & Gintis 2007, Shinada & Yamagishi norm enforcement.”
- GROUPS AND MORALITY (2014, background): “Game theory is another influential view of interpersonal interaction that focuses on morality by emphasizing trust and cooperation (for reviews, see Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Fehr & Gintis, 2007).”